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Disabling Dreams of Parenthood: The
Fertility Industry, Anti-discrimination,
and Parents with Disabilities
Kimberly M. Mutchersont
Introduction
To be a reproductive endocrinologist is to wield tremendous
power over procreation. On a daily basis, these physicians help
hundreds of people around the globe create babies. Critics of the
fertility industry frequently lament that those working in the field
of reproductive technology are playing God, as they manipulate
embryos, create and sustain pregnancies that could not exist or
continue without their aid, and bring the gift of biological
parenthood to those longing for it.1 Fertility providers, however,
do not just hold embryos in their sway, for these providers also
have the power to decide who their patients will be, and it is
unclear that decisions made in this vein are bias-free, especially
when the patients in question are living with disabilities.
In fertility practice, it is legally and ethically permissible for
a physician to refuse care to a patient when a medical assessment
reveals either that the patient cannot be helped with existing
technology, 2 or that an ensuing pregnancy would seriously
compromise the patient's own health.
As discussed below,
providers frequently justify these decisions with reference to
objective medical measures. By contrast, physicians who object to
providing care based on amorphous concerns about the parenting
skills of the patient and the best interests of the potential child
stand on enormously shaky ethical and legal ground.
Such
t. Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law - Camden. My thanks to
the wonderful members of the junior faculty at Rutgers with whom I have had
challenging and enlightening conversations about my work. I am extremely
grateful to the editors of and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice who
worked so diligently on this piece and sponsored a wonderful Symposium. And, as
always, to Samantha, Max, and Josephine who make the work worthwhile.
1. See, e.g., Hillary Rose and Steven Rose, Playing God, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July
3, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/20O3/jul/O3/genetics.comment
(describing various ethical concerns about emerging reproductive technologies).
2. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE (ASRM), FERTILITY
TREATMENT WHEN THE PROGNOSIS IS VERY POOR OR FUTILE, available at

http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/futility.pdf (noting that physicians may refuse to
provide fertility treatment if it would be futile).
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decisions presume that fertility providers have a right and,
perhaps, an obligation to make both medical and social decisions
about a potential patient's fitness for both pregnancy and
parenting. These assessments raise legitimate concerns about
what limits, if any, should be placed on a provider's ability to
decide that a person is not fit to receive fertility services due to a
risk to the patient from treatment or pregnancy, or a risk to a
fetus or future child (either in utero or after birth).
Defining the contours of good parenting is a gargantuan task
that is rivaled, if not surpassed, by the challenge of determining if
any one individual actually possesses good parenting skills. This
assessment is even harder when the individual in question has not
yet had a chance to put those skills into practice. When a person
stands on the verge of procreation, as does one who seeks fertility
treatment, any assessment of future parenting skill risks being
reductive and simplified, and may limit the number of individuals
allowed to reproduce with medical assistance-without necessarily
sparing any future child from harm.
Given that those living with disabilities have frequently been
singled out for ill treatment in the realm of procreation and
parenting (including a long history of sterilization abuse), 3 viewing
fertility care through the lens of discrimination against the
disabled provides a strong vantage point from which to evaluate
what duties fertility providers owe to patients, and what duties
society owes to those who face unjustified discrimination in their
quest to become parents. This Article does not claim that fertility
providers have no right to screen patients and reject those who are
found wanting, but that the reasoning behind such rejections
should be transparent and should rest upon concrete evaluations
of the proper role to be played by a fertility provider in judging
risks to patients and to future children.
Recognizing the complicated relationship between potential
patients and fertility doctors, this Article seeks to provide some
clarity and guidance to those facing the daunting task of accepting
or rejecting patients on the basis of their disability status. Part I
describes the various ways that physicians providing fertility
services decide to accept or reject patients, and highlights how
certain characteristics, such as disability, can lead to

3. Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded:
Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 945-54
(1981-1982) (providing a history of eugenic sterilization of the developmentally
disabled and urging greater protection of the fundamental rights of this
population).
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discrimination. Part II explains why it is appropriate to evaluate
discrimination in the fertility context as impacting an interest in
procreation, rather than an interest in parenting one's biological
children or in seeking to adopt children. Part III evaluates the
potential difficulties that a disabled person might face when
attempting to prove unlawful discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). Using the examples of an
HIV-positive woman and a quadriplegic woman, the Section
hypothesizes how such litigants would prove the applicability of
the statute and explains why the ADA should be interpreted in a
way that protects people with these substantial disabilities from
being denied access to treatment by fertility doctors. Finally, Part
IV mines the theoretical complications of risks that could warrant
denying access to fertility care to women living with HV or
quadriplegia. This Section describes the difference between direct
and indirect risks to the patient or the fetus and argues that
indirect risk, summarized as the risk of bad parenting, is most
often too amorphous to satisfy the ADA inquiry or ethical
standards.

I.

Cherry Picking Patients

Physicians in private practice may decline to provide services
a
given
patient for a variety of reasons, including: an excessive
to
patient load, the patient's inability to pay, personality conflicts, or
simple dislike of a patient. 4 In general, none of these reasons for
refusing care will subject the physician to a legally valid claim of
discrimination. 5 However, refusals to provide care based on
factors like race, ethnicity, or disability offend both professional
6
ethics and the law.

4. The ASRM explains:
Although a strong ethic urges physicians to treat all persons in need,
physician and professional autonomy is also an important value.
Ordinarily, physicians are free to decide whether to enter into a
doctor-patient relationship with a patient, and once in it, whether, with
adequate notice to the patients, to terminate that relation. Unless the
conditions of their employment require otherwise, physicians providing
fertility services are generally free not to provide those services to
individuals as they choose, subject only to federal and state laws against
unjustified discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, ethnicity, or
disability.

ASRM Ethics Comm., Child-RearingAbility and the Provision of Fertility Services,
82 FERTILITY & STERILITY (SuPP. 1) S208, S210 (2004) [hereinafter ASRM].
5. Id.

6. See, e.g., Jessamyn S. Berniker, Legal Implications of Discrimination in
Medical Practice,28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2000) (describing the potential for
lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for race-based discrimination in
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According to the American Society of Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), the fertility industry in the United States has
traditionally not engaged in any "systematic screening of [a
prospective
patient's] ability or competency
in rearing
children... ."7 Rather, the practice has been to treat those
seeking pregnancy through the use of technology the same as
providing healthcare). The ADA, as discussed in much greater detail later in this
Article, prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in public
accommodations, including doctor's offices. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a)
(West 2008). The concern here is not about bias in how care is provided, though
there is a substantial amount of scholarly literature detailing bias in providing care
to people of color, especially African-Americans. See Shankar Vedantam, The Color
of Health Care: Diagnosing Bias in Doctors, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2007, at A03
(describing a study by researchers at Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard
University affiliates that "provides empirical evidence for the first time that when
it comes to heart disease, bias is the central problem-bias so deeply internalized
that people are sincerely unaware that they hold it"). Without necessarily pointing
to physician bias as a cause, the federal government has put substantial resources
into addressing persistent disparities in healthcare access and outcomes for people
of color, noting that even as health and life span have improved over the last part
of the twentieth century:
[African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian/Pacific
Islanders, who represented 25 percent of the U.S. population, continued to
experience striking health disparities, including shorter life expectancy
and higher rates of diabetes, cancer, heart disease, stroke, substance
abuse, and infant mortality and low birth weight. Scientists believed these
health disparities resulted from the complex interaction among several
factors such as biology, the environment, and specific behaviours that were
significantly impacted by a shortage of racial and ethnic minority health
professionals, discrimination, and inequities in income, education, and
access to health care.
Nat'l Ctr. on Minority Health & Health Disparities, Health Disparities-Closing
the Gap: Fact Sheet, http://ncmhd.nih.gov/hdFactSheet-gap.asp (last visited Feb.
16, 2009). There is also literature suggesting that people with disabilities may not
receive the highest level of medical care to which they are entitled. See, e.g., H.
STEVEN KAYE, DISABILITY WATCH: THE STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 2, at 3-21 (2001) available at

http://www.dralegal.org/downloads/pubs/disability-watch2.pdf
(describing the
many ways in which people with disabilities are disadvantaged in accessing health
care and health insurance); Susan M. Havercamp et al., Health DisparitiesAmong
Adults with Developmental Disabilities,Adults with Other Disabilities,and Adults
Not Reporting Disability in North Carolina, 119 PUB. HEALTH REP. 418, 421 (2004)
(concluding in part that there were significant 'disparities in medical care
utilization for breast and cervical cancer screening and in oral health care for
adults with developmental disabilities); U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Access
to Quality Health Services and Disability-A Companion to Chapter 1 of Healthy
People 2010,
http://www.hhs.gov/od/about/fact-sheets/healthypeople20lO.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2009) (noting that "many physicians lack the training to meet the full range of
health care needs presented by an individual with particular disabling conditions,
much less to evaluate and treat that individual in a culturally sensitive and
competent manner"). This Article focuses not on bias in care, but rather on
physicians who would simply refuse to provide any care to a person based on that
patient's status as a person living with a disability.
7. ASRM, supra note 4, at S208.
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those who are able to reproduce coitally.8 In this sense, there has
been little attempt to create standards for providing treatment
other than those of good medicine, such as determining if a patient
is healthy enough to participate in treatment or if the patient can
be helped by available treatments. 9 Although screening for
parental ability has not been systematic, it is certainly the case
that various types of screening for physical fitness are a part of
fertility practice. 10
While available data is slim, it appears that fertility
providers use a range of screening tools before determining their
willingness to work with a given patient or provide a particular
service.11
As would be expected, providers routinely screen
patients-and their partners when relevant-for sexually
transmitted infections, including HIV, before attempting to
initiate a pregnancy. 12 Patients with specific concerns can also
request genetic screening to avoid passing on genes that can lead
to debilitating or deadly illnesses. 13 Screening for illness or
disease, particularly transmissible diseases, is a required part of
good medical practice in terms of ethics, professionalism, and legal

8. Id.
9. See The Practice Comm. of the ASRM, Optimal Evaluation of the Infertile
Female, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY (SuPP. 4) S169 (2004) (describing the optimal
testing and evaluation of a potential female infertility patient before the onset of
fertility treatment).
10. As "[p]reliminary preparation for an ART [assisted reproductive technology]
procedure may be as important as the procedure itself," the ASRM notes that
"testing for ovarian reserve may be recommended in order to predict how the
ovaries will respond to fertility medication." ASRM, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 14 (2008), availableat

http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/ART.pdf. Patients may also require
procedures to correct "[u]terine cavity abnormalities such as fibroids, polyps, or a
septum ....
Id. Potential patients should also address "lifestyle issues," such as
smoking, that can reduce the chance of pregnancy. Id. at 15. Finally, all potential
patients should receive "[a] complete exam and Pap smear" to identify problems
that should be corrected prior to attempting pregnancy. Id.
11. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) indicates that a
woman seeking to become pregnant using in vitro fertilization (IVF) should receive
the following tests: HIV, Hepatitis B antigen, Hepatitis C antibody, RPR, blood
group, Rh, and antibody screen. She should also have a Pap smear. SART,
PrerequisiteTesting,
http://www.sart.org/Guide_.PrerequisiteTesting.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
Presumably, these tests would also be required of a patient using other forms of
reproductive technology to become pregnant.
12. Id.
13. Id. (suggesting that patients of Jewish descent may choose to test for
Tay-Sachs and a variety of other diseases, patients who are African-American
might test for sickle-cell trait, and patients with a family history of developmental
disabilities might test for Fragile X).
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The greater challenge is deciding on what basis
liability. 14
providers can and should engage in screening intended not to
make determinations of health, but to make determinations of
parental fitness unrelated to health.
Most fertility providers believe that their work obligates
them to consider both the welfare of the fertility patient or
patients and the welfare of a future child prior to agreeing to help
5
One study on the screening
a patient achieve pregnancy.
practices of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) programs
found that though 59% of responding ART program directors
believe that everyone has a right to have a child, 64% of these
directors also believe "in their responsibility to consider a parent's
fitness before helping them conceive."' 6 That only a minority
(18%) of responding ART programs asked potential patients to
meet with a social worker or psychologist during their patient
screening process raises serious questions about how these
programs accurately and adequately evaluate parental fitness
without the aid of trained and skilled providers.' 7 This small
number of evaluations conducted by social workers and
psychologists starkly contrasts with the 80% of programs in which
8
potential patients meet with a financial coordinator. '
The study's authors identify two key values that guide
screening practices in the responding ART programs: "ensuring a
prospective child's safety and welfare and not risking the welfare
of the prospective mother."' 9 The answers that the directors
provided to questions about turning away hypothetical patients
Fifty-nine percent of
somewhat reflect these core values.
responding program directors would be very or extremely likely to
refuse service to an HIV-positive woman, while 55% felt the same
regarding a diabetic woman with a 10% chance of dying as a result
of her pregnancy. 20 Eighty-one percent of programs indicated that
they would be very or extremely likely to turn away a couple

14. Id. (explaining that some of the tests listed are required by law, while some
are required by "standards of care").
15. As used in this study, "screening" refers to "the assessment and
consideration of factors other than those that impact fertility and treatment
success or ability to pay in decisions about the provision of ART services." Andrea
D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive
Technology Programs,83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 62 (2005).
16. Id. at 63.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 64-65.
20. Id. at 63, 65.
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where the man has been physically abusive to an existing child.21
Fifty-three percent would be very or extremely likely to turn away
a man who does not have a wife/partner, and 48% would turn
away a gay couple seeking to use a surrogate to become
22
pregnant.
By contrast, 77% of respondents would be not at all likely or
slightly likely to turn away a woman who lacks a husband/partner
and 82% would be not at all likely or slightly likely to turn away a
lesbian couple hoping to achieve pregnancy through artificial
insemination.23 Sixty percent of the clinics would be not at all
likely or slightly likely to turn away couples where the woman has
a history of attempted suicide, and 68% answered similarly
regarding a couple where both members have limited intellectual
ability. 24 Finally, 66% would work with a woman with bipolar
disorder, and 91% would work with a couple where both members
25
had become blind from a car accident.
At the very least, these statistics indicate that certain
patients seeking fertility treatment may have to engage in
"fertility forum shopping" in order to find a provider willing to
work with them. As long as there is a provider willing to work
with the patient, it is assumed that the system, as it currently
exists, functions well enough. However, if there are valid societal
reasons to believe that limits should be placed upon a provider's
ability to refuse service to prospective parents, then the law should
not turn a blind eye to this form of discrimination. Further, the
discrimination occurring in this context may not be easily
discovered and rectified.
Providers may not always be
straightforward about why they are refusing care to a client and,
as a result, the patient will not be aware that she has been turned
away because of bias.
Some patients may be aware of
discrimination but may still choose not to pursue a legal remedy,
either to protect their privacy or because they are not interested in
receiving care from a provider who discriminates. Therefore, it
may be even more critical that those cases that do appear in court
are given a fair hearing.
These disparities in provider responses also reflect that there
is no overarching authoritative statement from a regulatory body
on what responsibilities, if any, healthcare providers have to
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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prospective parents seeking fertility services. 26 This lack of clarity
starkly contrasts with the United Kingdom, where the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), a regulatory
agency, specifically mandates that healthcare providers consider
the potential welfare of the child before providing fertility services
to prospective parents. 27 This assessment includes considering
factors that "are likely to cause serious physical, psychological or
medical harm, either to the child to be born or to any existing child
of the family." 28 The HFEA requires that providers factor in "any
aspect of the patient's (or, where applicable, their partner's) past
or current circumstances which means that either the child to be
born or any existing child of the family is likely to experience
serious physical or psychological harm or neglect." 29 Providers
should be concerned about any circumstances that would "likely
lead to an inability to care for the child to be born throughout its
childhood or which are already seriously impairing the care of any
existing child of the family." 30 In this context, the HFEA flags a
prospective parent's "mental or physical conditions,"31 "drug or
alcohol abuse," 32 or "any aspect of the patient's ... medical history
which means that the child to be born is likely to suffer from a
33
serious medical condition."
As this suggests, the provision of fertility services is closely
regulated in the United Kingdom, and the HFEA both supports
and demands thorough screening of potential parents. The U.K.
26. In its 2004 report on the ethics and practice of ART in the United States,
the President's Council on Bioethics provided a thorough overview of regulation
affecting the fertility industry. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPROD.
The
AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REG. OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 46-71 (2004).
authors note that some federal agencies play a limited role in regulating the
fertility industry. Id. at 47-51, 54-64. For instance, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) is charged with publishing an annual report on ART
clinic success rates. Id. at 47-51 (citing the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (1992) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 263a-1 et seq.)). State regulation is generally limited to statutes focused
on issues of access and insurance. Id. at 51. There is also some indirect regulation
of the industry, such as the Food and Drug Administration's role in approving
certain devices used in ART and the role of civil litigation in helping to set
standards for practice. Id. at 54-58, 69. However, there is no ultimate authority
comparable to the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) that controls the fertility industry in the United States.
27. HFEA, CODE OF PRACTICE § G.3 (7th ed. 2007), availableat
http://cop.hfea.gov.uk/cop/pdf/CodeOfPracticeVR_4.pdf.
28. Id. § G.3.3.2.
29. Id. § G.3.3.2(a).
30. Id. § G.3.3.2(b).
31. Id. § G.3.3.2(b)(i).
32. Id. § G.3.3.2(b)(ii).
33. Id. § G.3.3.2(c).
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system is premised on the idea that the government's obligations
to children, specifically to protect future children from the
possibility of physical or emotional harm, is a sufficient basis for
refusing care to an individual whose circumstances create a risk of
subpar parenting. 34 In the United States, however, the fertility
industry is premised on a privatized consumer-focused model.3 5
Within the U.S. model, patient screening is conducted in a
haphazard manner, based on criteria fashioned by individual
providers that may or may not conform to the voluntary codes of
professional organizations like the ASRM.
The ASRM, for
example, states that fertility providers "may withhold services
from prospective patients on the basis of well-substantiated
judgments" that the child would not be adequately provided for.36
The ASRM specifically singles out parents with disabilities as a
group to whom services should not be denied "except in rare
cases," and then only when "a well-substantiated basis exists for
thinking that they cannot provide or have others provide adequate
child-rearing for offspring." 37 This ethics opinion, however, has no
binding force, and providers need not worry that they will be
subject to legal sanction for failure to conform to the
recommendations of ASRM. 38 There is no overarching regulatory
body like the HFEA to subject them to fines or the loss of a license,
which could help to compel conformance to any particular set of

34. The HFEA makes clear that its code of practice is guided by several
principles, including: fair and reasonable consideration of prospective parents; the
duty of providers to not unfairly discriminate; and concern for the welfare and best
interests of the potential child. Id. § 1.2.
35. As author Debora Spar has written:
In the United States, however, regulatory and legislative authorities have
largely ignored the market for reproductive services. There are very few
restrictions on fertility treatments and little regulation of providers.
Instead, the market for fertility in the United States is vibrant,
competitive, and expanding in the absence of any kind of formal controls.
Because the United States is such a large and technically advanced
market, moreover, it serves as a magnet for infertile couples around the
world.
DEBORA SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 5 (2006).

36. ASRM, supra note 4, at S208.
37. Id.
38. The ASRM has a policy allowing for disciplinary actions, including removal,
if a member engages in conduct that is "injurious to the good order, peace,
reputation, or best interest of the Society, or is derogatory to its dignity,
inconsistent with its purposes, or shows a failure to maintain high ethical
standards." ASRM, ASRM Disciplinary Policy,
http://www.asrm.orgfProfessionals/Membership/disciplinary-policy.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009). The ASRM, however, is a professional organization and
membership in that organization is not a requirement for medical licensing of
healthcare providers.
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39

non- discrimination practices.
The U.S. model's lack of governmental control or oversight
does not automatically imply that it is flawed. However, the
absence of a uniform, overarching body for setting patient
screening standards means that prospective parents are at risk of
unfair discrimination, and future children may be denied the
opportunity to be raised by loving and competent parents. As
such, it is critical to consider the ramifications of ceding such an
important function-screening potential parents-to an industry
that lacks the ability to ensure the fairness and accuracy of such
assessments.
One tool for identifying and reining in abusive practices is
40
the existing body of anti-discrimination law, including the ADA,
which purports to protect people with disabilities from
discriminatory treatment when accessing public accommodations,
including healthcare. 41 In the absence of regulation, private
actions under applicable statutes may be the best-and perhaps
only-way to ensure equal access to fertility services to people
with disabilities.
II. Rejecting Parents
Before tackling some of the intricacies of the statutory law on
issues of disability discrimination, it is prudent to explain why, as
a normative matter, discriminating in access to parenting on the
basis of disability is a personal and societal wrong. In formulating
a solid argument about non-discrimination in the context of
fertility treatment, one must assert, as this Article does, that the
right to reproduce encompasses a positive right not to be
discriminated against in seeking the tools to create pregnancy,
42
rather than simply a negative right to be left alone to reproduce.
39. HFEA, supra note 27, § 1.3.
40. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2008)).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12184. In addition to the ADA, people living with
disabilities (including HIV or AIDS) who believe that they have been discriminated
against in accessing healthcare may sue under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which prohibits entities receiving federal aid from discriminating against otherwise
qualified people living with disabilities. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794(d) (2002).
42. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65
ALB. L. REV. 625, 630 (2002) ("Whether this positive right [to reproduce], however,
also extends to non-coital forms of procreation-including widely used technologies
such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) and artificial insemination-is a matter of
conjecture to which one can only make an educated guess."); cf. JOHN A.
ROBERTSON,

CHILDREN

OF CHOICE: FREEDOM

AND THE NEW

REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGIES 23, 116-18 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996) (1994) (stating that as a
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The ADA, as discussed in detail later in this Article, does not
create a right to medical care; it simply says that a person with
disabilities should be able to seek medical care on the same terms
as a person who is not disabled. 43 Thus, while a person living with
a disability could not claim that a physician must work with her
even if she could not pay, it is perfectly appropriate to be placed on
equal footing with other patients who meet the logical criteria for
care.
To justify denying access to fertility treatment for certain
potential patients, one could make the analogy to the ways in
which a State may interfere with an individual's fundamental
right to the care and custody of a child. 44 The argument generally
holds that if the right to legally parent can be withdrawn,
manipulated, or completely withheld (particularly as it comes into
conflict with the State's parens patriae interest in protecting
children) then it is appropriate to act even earlier and avoid ever
45
placing a child in harm's way.
State laws that provide for the termination of parental rights
can and have been used to temporarily and permanently remove
children from the care of parents who, by reason of their physical
or mental disabilities, have proven themselves incapable of

matter of constitutional law, procreative liberty is solely a negative right; however,
as a matter of social justice, the exercise of the right may be "severely constrained
by social and economic circumstances").
43. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a) (West 2008).
44. Every state has statutes that allow for the termination of parental rights
when a parent is accused of abusing or neglecting a dependent child. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 26-18-7 (1995 & Supp. 2008), renumbered as § 12-15-319 (effective Jan. 1,
2009) (listing grounds for termination of parental rights and factors to be
considered); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (describing conditions
under which termination of parental rights may be granted); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
119, §§ 26 & 29C & ch. 210, § 3 (2003 & Supp. 2009) (describing standards for the
protection and care of children, judicial certification of the need to remove children
from the home, and dispensing with required consent in certain adoptions); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-11.2, 30:4C-15 (2008) (noting that reasonable efforts to
prevent placement of a child are not required in certain situations of parental
abuse, and describing guardianship in cases of parental abuse).
45. Arthur Caplan from the Center for Bioethics at the University of
Pennsylvania has written:
With all due respect, the idea that doctors should not set limits on who can
use reproductive technology to make babies is ethically bonkers . ..
Doctors have an obligation to consider patients' requests for treatment, but
they do not have to honor them. One very good reason not to do so is if a
doctor believes that what the patient wants would put children at grave
risk.
Arthur Caplan, Ethics and Octuplets: Society Is Responsible, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/opinion/39190377.html.
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providing a safe and stable home. 46 Many of the cases involve
parents with developmental disabilities or mental health
diagnoses. 47 While a review of these cases suggests that these
parents often have limitations on their parenting ability beyond
their disabilities, their disability status coupled with its impact on
parenting skills is a solid and supportable basis for severing the
relationship between a parent and her child. 48 Certainly these
disabled parents have the same fundamental right to the care and
custody of a child as their non-disabled counterparts. 49 That right,
however, cannot prevail when a court finds that a parent's
disability has contributed to circumstances in which a child is
endangered or neglected. Many state statutes specifically list
disability as a reason why a parent might lose custody of a child.50
Although disability alone is not a sufficient cause for a child's
removal from the care of a parent, a disability significant enough
to impact parenting abilities is certainly a sufficient basis to
51
terminate parental rights.
46. See, e.g., In re M.F., 762 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding a finding
of parental unfitness in a case involving a schizophrenic mother); Bartell v.
Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (upholding the termination of
parental rights of a developmentally-disabled mother).
47. See, e.g., In re C.S., 878 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that a
schizophrenic parent was entitled to a mental examination prior to being judged
unfit); In re Cornica J., 814 N.E.2d 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that
developmentally-disabled parents were unfit).
48. See, e.g., In re B.S., 740 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (severing the
parental rights of a mother with drug dependency and mental health issues),
overruled by In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d 1233 (Ill. 2001) (stating that strict scrutiny
review must be met before the parent-child relationship can be severed on grounds
of disability).
49. One court contending with the issue of terminating the parental rights of a
mentally-retarded parent wrote:
Consequently, certain personal rights have been deemed fundamental to
the concept of ordered liberty and worthy of constitutional protection.
Among these are the rights to marry, procreate, use contraceptives,
undergo abortion, engage in family relationships and rear and educate
children. These rights are conferred upon all persons, including the
retarded. Therefore, as a result of the impact of section 8 of the Adoption
Act upon parental rights, the interest affected in this case is no less than
the right of a parent who has been adjudicated mentally retarded to
"establish a home and bring up children."
Helvey v. Rednour, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citations omitted).
50. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
OF STATE LAwS 2,
available at
SUMMARY
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS:
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwideflaws-policies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf
(noting that "long-term mental illness or deficiency of the parent(s)" is a ground for
involuntary termination of parental rights in most states).
51. See, e.g., In re Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1982) (en banc)
(holding that the evidence sustained a finding that the mother's mental disability
was of such a duration and nature to render her unlikely to provide reasonable care
for her child); Helvey, 408 N.E.2d at 21-22 (citations omitted) (holding that before
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Many state agencies provide services to a parent in order to
allow the parent to maintain a relationship with the child, but
there are limits on the level of service that they must provide,
especially when it appears that the parent is not cooperating with
the agency's efforts. 52 Some parents have attempted to use the
ADA to force child welfare agencies to provide services to help
ameliorate the consequences of a disability. 53 Thus far, state
courts have not been amenable to using the ADA in this way, and
have rejected arguments claiming a lack of reasonable
accommodations for a mentally disabled parent faced with family
court proceedings. 54
It is certainly the case that once a child exists, the State need
not ignore a parent's disability, and perhaps need not make
significant concessions to that disability in determining whether a
child should remain with a parent or be removed on a temporary
Comparisons to the right to parent,
or permanent basis. 5
however, are not particularly helpful in this context. First, the
right to parent, most often understood as the fundamental right to
the care and custody of one's children, is separate and apart from a
right to procreate. 5 6 One need not have been involved in creating
the mother could be deprived of her right to raise her child, a hearing had to be
held to determine her fitness under the Adoption Act).
52. Under the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act and state law, child
welfare agencies are obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunite a child with
her family of origin. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 2, available at

FOR CHILDREN:

http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/reunifyall.pdf
[hereinafter CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, REUNIFICATION]. These efforts can
be dispensed with in extreme circumstances, such as when the parent has been
convicted of homicide or has been accused of abandonment, chronic abuse, or sexual
abuse. Id.
53. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D. Miss. 1998).
54. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, REUNIFICATION, supra note 52, at 2.
55. See, e.g., Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656
N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (terminating the parental rights of
developmentally disabled parents); In re K.H.K., 1999 WL 1191509 (Mont. Dec. 7,
1999) (terminating the parental rights of a developmentally-disabled parent).
56. The rights to marry and to procreate are "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race" and, therefore, an individual's ability to reproduce is not
to be taken away without exacting scrutiny being applied to such a measure.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The right to parent, as articulated
by the Court in cases like Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), does
not refer to procreation, but to the cardinal notion that:
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder. . . . And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.
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a child in order to become that child's parent, and part of the
rationale of denying access to genetically-shared embryos is the
belief that those who are denied this method of procreation are not
Unlike with
necessarily denied any right to procreate. 57
parenting, however, States have much less leeway in interfering
with procreative choice, and accessing ART is much more akin to
exercising one's right to procreate than it is to exercising one's
right to parent. 58
The limited legal value of any perceived right to parent is
understood when reviewing how the law deals with those seeking
to adopt children. Adoption agencies routinely set limits on who
can adopt a child. 59 These agencies screen for age, income, and
disability and disease status. 60 There is no fundamental right to
adopt that is equivalent to the fundamental right to the care and
6
custody of a child or the fundamental right to procreate. ' It is
widely understood that adoption agencies, both public and private,
engage in rampant discrimination when determining who can and
cannot adopt a child. 62 I use the term discrimination here in a

Id.
57. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181-82 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding an agreement
between parties regarding the disposition of frozen embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that a party wishing to avoid procreation
should usually prevail in a dispute over frozen embryos).
58. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (defining individuals'
rights concerning procreation); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (defining individuals'
rights concerning sterilization and procreation).
59. ADOPTION & CHILD WELFARE LAWSITE, WHO MAY ADOPT & WHO MAY BE
ADOPTED,

http://www.adoptionchildwelfarelaw.org/faq-detail.php?id=97 (last visited May 5,
2009) (describing some limitations on who may adopt a child).
60. Adoption.com, Review of Qualification Requirements for Prospective
Adoptive Parents,
http://adopting.adoption.com/child/review-of-qualification-requirements-forprospective-adoptive-parents,4.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
61. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding "neither a
fundamental right nor a privacy interest in adopting a child"); see also Martin v.
Putnam, 427 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Miss. 1983) (stating that adoption statutes confer a
privilege, not a right, to adopt); In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886
(Ohio 1990) (finding the right to adopt to be permissive and not absolute).
62. For instance, some agencies may be reluctant to work with single people,
older parents, gays and lesbians, or people with disabilities. Lucia Moses, Special
Circumstances,
http://www.theadoptionguide.com/advice/articles/special-circumstances.php
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009). In the past, concerns about racial discrimination in
adoption placements prompted Congress to act to end practices that could lead to
extended stays in foster care for hard-to-place children, including children of color.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., PROTECTION FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civihrights/resources/specialtopics/adoption/secl808asumma
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neutral sense, as opposed to implying that these choices to exclude
people from being potential adoptive parents are legally or
necessarily morally suspect. Adoption agencies screen potential
63
parents for histories of criminal conduct or abuse of children.
They conduct home studies to ensure that a child's new home is a
safe and nurturing environment, both in terms of the physical
space and the characteristics of the adoptive parents. 64 A home
study may cost up to $3,000 and generally consists of at least one
visit to the prospective adoptive home by a social worker. 65 This
process requires the adoptive parents to open up their lives to
strangers. Potential adoptive parents will be asked questions
about their family history, finances (including tax returns),
medical information, alcohol and drug use history, employment
status, support systems, readiness for parenting, past experiences
with children, work history, theories on parenting, feelings about
adoption, and personal relationships.6 6 Prospective parents may
be subjected to psychological evaluations and, in private adoptions,
they may participate in interviews with birth parents in order to
be selected as the recipients of a particular woman's baby. 67 Thus,
the adoption paradigm is one of limitations and exclusions.
To the extent that adoption is about parenting and not
procreation, it is arguably justified that those seeking to adopt a
child should be treated differently than those who opt to become
parents by exercising their right to procreate. Adoption involves
an actual child, rather than a hypothetical child, or at least an
actual fetus in need of caretakers, thus avoiding the conceptual
difficulty of determining the scope of one's duty to a non-entity. As
such, adoption seeks to find parents for a child who, in some sense,
has already been put at risk because she is being born to parents
ry.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). Many agencies set criteria intended to screen
out supposedly undesirable parents, such as single people or same sex couples. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (forbidding gays and
lesbians from acting as foster or adoptive parents). Some adoption agencies have a
specific religious agenda that places limits on the prospective parents with whom
they will work. See, e.g., Christian World Adoption, http://www.cwa.org/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009) (describing itself as a Christian International Adoption Agency
that believes that "God is in Control of Our Agency & Your Adoption").
63. Lucia Moses, Surviving the Homestudy,
http://www.theadoptionguide.com/process/articles/surviving-the-homestudy
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
64. ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, PREPARING FOR YOUR HOMESTUDY (2005), available at

http://www.theadoptionguide.com/files/Homestudy.pdf.
65. See Moses, supra note 63.
66. See ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, supra note 64.
67. Lois Gilman & Susan Freivalds, Adoption Options (2009), available at
http://www.theadoptionguide.com/options/articles/adoption-options.php.
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incapable or unwilling to parent, or because her parents have
already abused or neglected her according to an adjudicating
court. When a child has already suffered or is certain to suffer, the
impetus to find stable, well-qualified parents is justifiably strong
and controlling.
In general, the fertility industry has not modeled itself after
the adoption paradigm. 68 Instead, the industry has focused on
playing a minimal role in screening, and thus maximizing
opportunity for those who seek fertility services. 69 Psychological
screening, pre-conception interviews, home studies, and criminal
background checks are in no way a standard part of fertility
practice. 70 In fact, most clinics report little to no parental fitness
screening of potential patients, and some express a certain level of
discomfort with the idea of being asked or required to engage in
this type of intensive and invasive screening process. 71 Given that
access to treatment, assuming the required financial resources, is
fairly relaxed, it is prudent to query whether there are valid
reasons for disability to become one of a miniscule number of
reasons why fertility providers move away from their basic stance
of providing services without prejudice.
III. Different Disabilities, Different Decisions
To challenge the accuracy of these screening decision
assumptions about parenting ability, this Article evaluates two
forms of disability-HIV-positive status and quadriplegia-and
the relationship of each to the fertility industry and to the antidiscrimination principles espoused by the ADA. As mentioned
earlier, one study indicates that 59% of fertility clinics would be
very or extremely likely to turn away a couple where the woman is
HIV-positive. 72 Therefore, the first topic for consideration is
discrimination against potential parents living with HIV, with a
focus on an HIV-positive woman seeking to become pregnant. The
68. See ASRM, supra note 4, at S208 ('While some psychological or social
screening may occur in determining whether a person or couple will be able to
understand, tolerate, and comply with the demands of infertility treatment, much
less attention ordinarily is focused on the home or rearing situation of children
born as a result of treatment.").
69. See id. ("As with persons who reproduce coitally, no systemic screening of
their ability or competency in rearing children has traditionally occurred or been
thought to be appropriate, as would ordinarily occur in adoption.").
70. Id.
71. Gurmankin et al., supra note 15, at 62; see also BETH KOHL, EMBRYO
CULTURE: MAKING BABIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 149-54 (discussing the

various age limitations enforced by fertility clinics on prospective mothers).
72. Gurmankin et al., supra note 15, at 65.
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second topic addresses physical disability in the form of
quadriplegia, focusing on the mothering and pregnancy choices of
a quadriplegic woman. I chose these extreme examples to
highlight both the different ways that concerns about children can
be expressed in fertility treatment discourse, and the range of
disabilities that could trigger bias.
The focus on women is appropriate for several reasons. First,
while infertility appears to strike men and women in fairly equal
numbers, 73 any successful solution to a fertility problem will
necessarily involve creating a pregnancy that can only be carried
by a person with the capacity to become pregnant. 74 Second,
pregnancy itself carries specific risks for the woman and for her
fetus that merit special consideration. Furthermore, despite some
shifts in gender roles, women, even those who work outside of the
home, are frequently the primary caretakers of children born into
a family. 75 Therefore, a potential mother's parental fitness may be
subject to greater scrutiny than the parental fitness of a potential
father.
In this Section, I will first evaluate potential barriers to
ADA protection for individuals living with HIV or quadriplegia
who seek access to fertility services. Next, I will explain why the
ADA should protect people with these substantial disabilities from
being denied access to treatment by fertility doctors. Though a
woman with either of the described conditions should be able to
meet the Act's definition of disability, some of the Act's limitations,
specifically those dealing with direct threat or reasonable
accommodation, would make proving a case of unlawful
discrimination more difficult than it might first appear.
A. The HIV-Positive Patient
Since the beginning of the HIV epidemic, HIV-positive

73. The ASRM reports that "[infertility affects about 7.3 million women and
their partners in the U.S.-about 12% of the reproductive-age population" and that
the disease affects men and women equally. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions
About Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2009) (citing CDC, NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 14 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalseries/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf).
74. While it is true that transgender men have-famously in the case of
Thomas Beatie-chosen to become pregnant, it is also true that one must possess
the biologically female characteristics of a woman, specifically a uterus, in order to
become pregnant and bear a child. Thomas Beatie, Labor of Love, THE ADvoc.,
Apr. 8, 2008, at 24. Interestingly, Beatie reports that he and his wife experienced
discrimination in their attempt to find a fertility doctor who would work with them
and eventually the two opted to perform inseminations at home. Id.
75. See JUDITH WARNER, PERFECT MADNESS 117 (2005).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 27:311

patients have felt the reluctance of some healthcare providers, for
legitimate or illegitimate reasons, to provide services to them. 76
As one study notes, "[a]lthough still an ongoing problem, over time
and with better knowledge of transmission risks, discrimination
toward HIV-1 seropositive patients has declined. Patients with
infertility, however, have typically been denied therapy, partly
because of the unique medical and ethical concerns surrounding
reproduction." 77 As of 2003, "[]ess than 5% of [ART] clinics in the
United States [offered] reproductive care to HIV-1 serodiscordant
couples."7 8 Even as the severity of discrimination wanes, people
seeking access to fertility treatment may still find that their
HIV-positive status acts as a bar to treatment. Physician concerns
tend to center around "the potential risk of transmitting [the]
virus to the embryo, fetus, or mother, as well as worries over the
socioeconomic impact of raising a child by a parent with a
79
potentially fatal disease."
Every person who has AIDS is HIV-positive, but not every
person who is HIV-positive has AIDS.80 HIV is a progressive
disease that, especially when left untreated, leads to a breakdown
of the immune system in most people.8 1 As a result, people who
are HIV-positive are at risk for opportunistic infections (01) that
can be disabling and/or life-threatening.8 2 A physician will
diagnose an HIV-positive person with AIDS when the individual's
immune system is severely weakened such that the patient's

76. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 651-55 (1998) (involving a
dentist's refusal to provide in-office, routine dental care to an asymptomatic
HIV-positive patient); Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (involving an
obstetrician who transferred care of an HIV-positive woman to a specialist).
77. Klein et al., Understanding the Motivations, Concerns, and Desires of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus 1-Serodiscordant Couples Wishing to Have
Children Through Assisted Reproduction, 101 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 987, 987
(2003).
78. Mark V. Sauer, ProvidingFertility Care to Those with HIV: Time to
Re-Examine HealthcarePolicy, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 33, 38 (2003).
79. Id. at 33.
80. See CDC, What is AIDS, Basic Information,
http://cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009) ("AIDS is the
final stage of HIV infection. It can take years for a person infected with HIV ... to
reach this stage.").
81. See National Institutes of Health (NIH), HIV and Its Treatment: What You
Should Know, Dec. 2008, available at
http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/HrVandItsTreatment cbrochure.en.pdf
[hereinafter NIH] ("[I]f left untreated, HIV infection damages a person's immune
system and can progress to AIDS.").
82. See Sauer, supra note 78, at 33 ("[AIDS] remains a serious disease; if not
treated, patients typically succumb to either opportunistic infections or cancer.").
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CD483 count drops below 200 cells/mm 3 or if she develops an AIDSdefining condition, meaning an illness seldom seen in someone
who is not living with HIV.84 HIV specialists monitor their
patients' CD4 count, which measures the presence of the white
blood cells that normally fight infection in the body and which are
targeted for destruction by HIV.85 Physicians also monitor the
patient's viral load. This gauges the amount of HIV circulating in
a person's blood, and is an indicator of how well an individual's
treatment regimen is working. 86
For people living in relatively resource-rich settings, like the
United States, physicians recommend early treatment for HIV
infection to delay the onset of AIDS, reduce susceptibility to
opportunistic infections, and protect the health of the immune
system.8 7 The standard of care is for a person to take Highly
Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART), which consists of daily
therapy with three or more antiretroviral drugs.8 8 While the
treatment has proven to be enormously successful in saving and
extending the lives of many people living with HIV, 8 9 it is not
without its drawbacks. First, side effects from the medications can
be significant and include "liver problems... , diabetes. .. , high
cholesterol . . . , high levels of lactate in the blood. . . , abnormal
fat distribution (lipodystrophy syndrome) . .. , decreased bone
skin rash . . . , pancreatitis (inflammation of the
density . . .
, nerve problems ... [and] increased bleeding in
pancreas) .
patients with hemophilia." 90 Second, the discipline involved in
taking the medications can be a stretch for some people, 9 1 and

83. "CD4 cells are a type of white blood cell that fights infection." See NIH,
supra note 81.
84. Id.
85. See id. ("When HIV enters a person's CD4 cells, it uses the cells to make
copies of itself. This process destroys cells, and the CD4 count goes down.").
86. See id. ("A viral load test measures the amount of HIV in a sample of blood.
This test shows how well your immune system is controlling the virus.").
87. See CDC, HIV Testing,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testing/resources/qa/qa-professional.htm (last visited
Apr. 27, 2009) (discussing the benefits of early treatment versus the substantial
costs incurred).
88. See NIH, supra note 81 ('These guidelines recommend that you take a
combination of three or more medications from different classes .. .in a regimen
called Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART).").
89. See Sauer, supra note 78, at 35 ('The use of highly active antiretroviral
therapy (HAART) has extended the life expectancy of most patients indefinitely.").
90. NIH, supranote 81.
91. See id. ("Many people adhere well to their treatment early on but find
adherence becomes more difficult over time.").
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failing to take doses as required can lead to drug resistance. 92
Third, the substantial cost of medications can be prohibitive. 93
Despite the significant advances in treatment for people with
HIV,94 the reality of the illness is that the disease itself or its
treatment can substantially compromise the quality of an infected
person's life. There is no cure, and the infection is both
life-altering and life-ending. 95 Though HAART is not a cure,
access to such therapy has encouraged an evolution in attitudes
toward people living with HIV and "[t]oday, HIV-1-infected
individuals with access to highly active antiretroviral therapy are
living longer, healthier lives, and most physicians now consider
the illness to be of a chronic rather than a terminal nature." 96
Faced with the complications and difficulties of life with HIV,
some women opt not to pursue pregnancy, 97 but many others will
not let their diagnosis keep them from pursuing dreams of
biological parenthood, particularly given that many U.S. women
living with HIV are of childbearing age. 98 Undoubtedly, many of
those women have health concerns, especially those related to the
potential transmission of HIV to a future child or a sexual partner,
and these concerns will be of paramount concern when considering

92. Id. ("When you skip a medication dose, even just once, the virus has the
opportunity to reproduce more rapidly.").
93. One study estimated the average cost of HAART at $2,100-$4,700 per
month depending upon a person's health status when she begins treatment. CBS
News, Got HIV? Lifetime Cost: $618,900, Nov. 2, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/02/health/webmd/main2147219.shtml.
94. See Sauer, supra note 78, at 33 ("HAART has dramatically altered the
clinical course of [HIV-1].").
95. See NIH, supra note 81 (discussing the negative side effects of treatment,
which may prolong life but will not cure HIV infections).
96. Klein et al., supra note 77, at 987.
97. In one study of women living with HIV or AIDS in the Midwest, researchers
found that only 25.7% of women studied chose to become pregnant after their
diagnosis as HIV-positive. Shonda M. Craft et al., Pregnancy Decisions Among
Women with HIV, 11 AIDS BEHAV. 927, 930 (2007). Women under the age of 30
were more likely to seek pregnancy than those over age 30. Id. at 931 ("Among
women aged 30 and under, 39.5% chose to become pregnant while only 11.1% did
among women over 30.").
98. In August 2008, the CDC wrote, "[f]or women of all races and ethnicities,
the largest number of HIV/AIDS diagnoses during recent years was for women
aged 15-39." CDC, HIV/AIDS AMONG WOMEN (2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/women/resources/factsheets/pdf/women.pdf;
see also,
Tamara Zutlevics, Should ART be Offered to HIV-serodiscordant and HIVseroconcordant Couples?: An Ethical Discussion, 21 HuM. REPROD., 1956, 1956
(2006) ("[W]hilst the number of women with HIV approaching clinics is in general
below 1% of all clients, it is inevitable that the demand will increase, necessitating
a carefully considered response by clinics.").
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pregnancy. 99 The modern availability of various pre- and
post-pregnancy technologies that minimize transmission risk will
be welcome, even though many HIV-positive women lack the
resources to avail themselves of all options.10 0 For any
HIV-positive woman seeking pregnancy, consultation with medical
personnel will be critically important before, during, and after
pregnancy and childbirth. 01 Keeping the nature of the disease in
mind, this Article will describe the interplay among HIV status,
fertility treatment, and the ADA.
The ADA requires a multi-step inquiry in order to determine
whether the statute's protections against unlawful discrimination
apply to disabled persons seeking fertility treatment. 102 Litigants
claiming discrimination in the provision of reproductive health
services on the basis of HIV status must meet the threshold
requirements of the ADA: first, that the plaintiff is disabled as
defined by the Act; 10 3 and second, the conduct complained of does
in fact violate the statute's prohibition on discrimination because
there is a readily achievable reasonable accommodation to be
made for the patient, or because the patient does not present a
direct threat to herself or others.104 Under Subchapter III of the
Act, pertaining to public accommodations, healthcare providers
are prohibited from discriminating against disabled patients in the
5
provision of health services. 10
Any successful ADA claim begins with a person who is
disabled under the meaning of the Act. This requires "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
06
impairment."

99. See Craft et al., supra note 97, at 931 (discussing the main factors in the
"decision-making process concerning pregnancy-related issues" found in the study).
100. Tarun Jain & Mark D. Hornstein, Disparities in Access to Infertility
Services in a State with Mandated Insurance Coverage, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY
221, 222 (2005) (noting that even with mandated insurance coverage, disparities in
fertility coverage exist, with most of those availing themselves of treatment being
White, highly educated, and upper income).
101. See, e.g., Craft et al., supra note 97, at 931 ("[W]omen with HIV who chose
to continue their pregnancies did so, in part, with an intention to continue or begin
HIV medications.").
102. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (West 2008).
103. Id. § 12102(2).
104. Id. § 12182.
105. Id. § 12181(7)(F) (defining a public accommodation to include the
"professional office of a health care provider").
106. Id. § 12102(2).
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In interpreting the statutory language, the Supreme Court
has determined that even asymptomatic HIV infection' 07 is a
The Court also
disability for purposes of ADA analysis. 0
determined that reproduction is a major life activity, 10 9 and that
women living with HIV are substantially impaired in their ability
First, an HIV-positive woman
to reproduce in two ways." 0
seeking to become pregnant through unprotected sexual
intercourse poses a transmission risk to her sexual partner."'
The Court cited studies indicating "20% of male partners of women
with HIV became HIV-positive themselves, with a majority of the
2
studies finding a statistically significant risk of infection."'
Second, a woman living with HLV who becomes pregnant poses a
transmission risk to her fetus and future child. 113 The Court was
not persuaded by the argument that treatment with
antiretrovirals during pregnancy and labor could lower the risk of
vertical (mother-to-child) transmission sufficiently to remove the
disability. "4 Declining to decide whether the disabled person had
to be evaluated in a mitigated or unmitigated state, the Court
determined that "[iut cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8%
risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction.""15 The
fact that a person could choose to confront these risks did not
persuade the Court that the individual therefore was not

107. "Asymptomatic HIV infection is a phase of chronic infection with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) during which there are no symptoms of HIV
infection." U.S. Nat'l Library of Med. and the NIH, Medline Plus Medical
Encyclopedia,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/0O0682.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2009) [hereinafter NIH, Medical Encyclopedia].
108. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) ("In light of the immediacy
with which the virus begins to damage the infected person's white blood cells and
the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of
infection.").
109. Id. at 638 ("Reproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.'
Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process
itself.").
110. Id. at 639 (describing two ways in which HIV "substantially limit[s the]
ability to reproduce").
111. Id. ("[A] woman infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on
the man a significant risk of becoming infected.").
112. Id. (holding that HIV substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction).
113. Id. at 640 ("[A]n infected woman risks infecting her child during gestation
and childbirth.").
114. Id. at 640-41.
115. Id. at 641.
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substantially impaired in the major life activity of reproduction. 116
The Court wrote:
The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life
activities, not utter inabilities. Conception and childbirth are
not impossible for an HIV victim but, without doubt, are
dangerous to the public health. This meets the definition of a
substantial limitation. The decision to reproduce carries
economic and legal consequences as well. There are added
costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and
long-term health care for the child who must be examined and,
tragic to think, treated for the infection. The laws of some
States, moreover, forbid persons infected with HIV to have sex
with others, regardless of consent ....

In the

end, the

disability definition does not turn on personal choice. When
significant limitations result from the impairment, the
definition is met even if the difficulties are not
insurmountable. For the statistical and other reasons we have
cited, of course, the limitations on reproduction may be
insurmountable here. Testimony from the respondent that
her HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child is
unchallenged. 117

Based on Bragdon, it is possible to successfully argue that a
person living with HIV, who is in the best of health, 118 could still
be disabled for purposes of an ADA evaluation because a woman's
ability to reproduce is severely impaired by the fact that she is
HIV-positive, regardless of her present health status. 1 9 The
Bragdon decision, however, was not the Court's final
interpretation of the ADA. 120
In the years following Bragdon, the Supreme Court decided
several cases in which it placed significant limitations on the use
of the Act to protect people with disabilities from discrimination.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. An individual with an asymptomatic HLV infection has a low viral load, no
opportunistic infections, and no significant side effects from medication. See, e.g.,
NIH, Medical Encyclopedia, supra note 107 (describing the characteristics of
asymptomatic HIV infection, and noting that some people can remain
asymptomatic for 10 years or longer); see also NIH, supra note 81 (describing HIV
and its treatment, and noting that a positive HIV test result does not mean that a
person has AIDS).
119. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643 ('Based on the medical knowledge available to us,
we believe that it is reasonable to conclude that the life activity of procreation... is
substantially limited for an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual."' (quoting 12
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 273 (1988))).
120. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (interpreting the
reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc.
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (interpreting the "substantially limited" language
of the ADA's disability definition).
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For example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 121 the Court decided
the mitigation question that it declined to address in Bragdon,
holding that a person claiming disability discrimination must be
evaluated in a mitigated state in order to determine if she meets
the threshold disability criteria for seeking protection under the
Act. 122 The consequences of Sutton for people living with treatable
ailments were significant. In the years following Sutton, courts
denied ADA protection to individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes because use of insulin ameliorates the impairment
associated with the underlying disease. 123 Courts dismissed these
cases at the summary judgment stage even when an employer
admitted to taking adverse action against an employee because of
that individual's status as a diabetic. 124 In the Sutton era,
advocates for people living with HIV feared that an HIV-positive
victim of discrimination, whose health status was well controlled
through the use of powerful medications, might be unable to
prevail on a claim where a defendant argued that, with treatment,
the HIV-positive person was no longer substantially impaired.
Under this logic, HIV medications act like insulin or corrective
lenses, in that they remove the substantial impairment. In such a
case, were the Court's reasoning in Sutton allowed to stand, an
HIV-positive plaintiff might fail to meet the threshold requirement
121. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub: L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Collado v. UPS, 419 F.3d 1143, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding
that summary judgment was appropriate where an insulin dependent diabetic
could not show that he was substantially impaired in any major life activity);
Shultz v. Potter, 142 F. App'x 598, 599 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that summary
judgment was appropriate where a diabetic plaintiff could not show that she was
impaired in any major life activity due to her illness). But see Fraser v. Goodale,
342 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a diabetic employee demonstrated
a material issue of fact on the question of whether her illness substantially
impaired the major life activity of eating).
124. See, e.g., Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2006) (granting
summary judgment in favor of a postmaster general in a case brought by a diabetic
postal employee claiming a failure to reasonably accommodate his symptoms under
the Rehabilitation Act); Shultz, 142 F. App'x 598 (holding that summary judgment
was appropriate where a diabetic plaintiff could not show that she was impaired in
any major life activity due to her illness); Salim v. MGM Grand Detroit, 106 F.
App'x 454 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer
because the employee failed to prove that she was disabled in bringing suit for
common law slander, discriminatory discharge, and other discrimination under the
ADA and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Rights Act); Orr v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (granting summary judgment to
an employer because a diabetic pharmacist was not disabled under the ADA);
Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 46 F. App'x 364 (7th Cir. 2002) (granting
summary judgment to an employer because the employee was not "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA).
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for a successful ADA claim.
Such an absurd result can now be avoided in the wake of
amendments to the ADA that went into effect on January 1,
2009.125 Recognizing that the Court's interpretations of the ADA
had led to significant and unwarranted narrowing of the statute's
scope, Congress amended the ADA to reinstate the broad
definition of disability that it originally intended. 126 The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (Amendments Act) makes several
specific references to Sutton, including noting in its purpose
section that the Act sought "to reject the requirement enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., [sic] 527
U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be
determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures."' 127 The Amendments Act also rejects the Supreme
Court's holdings in the post-Sutton case of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,128 which heightened
the threshold for proving impairment, making it less likely that a
plaintiff could establish that she was substantially impaired. 129
The amendments to the ADA make clear that the Act should
be read
expansively to protect disabled people from
125. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008).
126. Id. § 2(a)(4) (finding that "the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., [sic] 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have
narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect").
127. Id. § 2(b)(2).
128. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
129. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b) states that it was enacted:
(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, [sic] 534 U.S. 184
(2002), that the terms "substantially' and "major" in the definition of
disability under the ADA "need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," and that to be
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA "an
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives";
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the
Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, [sic] 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits", and applied
by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately
high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to
convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under
the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the
question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the
ADA should not demand extensive analysis.
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discrimination. 130 Thus, a person living with HIV might have
several routes to proving her status as disabled under the Act.
First, a potential plaintiff could proceed on the basis of a record of
impairment, or being perceived as impaired even if she is not in
fact impaired.' 3 ' Even during the Sutton era, these elements of
the statute remained available for people living with
disabilities. 132 Second, the Amendments Act makes clear that the
basic premise of Bragdon, that impairment is not to be judged on
the basis of "utter inabilities" to engage in a major life activity,
remains intact. 133 Even as medicine makes access to biological
parenthood increasingly possible for HIV-positive people by
decreasing the risk of transmission, the ADA should still apply
because the fact remains that procreating under these
circumstances presents risks to the public health and carries
134
economic and potentially legal consequences.
Even if the HIV-positive plaintiff established her disability
for purposes of the ADA, her claim might not prevail. A defendant
physician could still argue that there was no obligation to treat her
because, as the Department of Justice (DOJ) makes clear, a
physician is not obliged to provide medical care to every
HIV-positive patient. The DOJ explains:
A health care provider is not required to treat a person who is
seeking or requires treatment or services outside the
provider's area of expertise. However, a health care provider
cannot simply refer a patient with HIV/AIDS to another
provider simply because the patient has HIV/AIDS.
The
referral must be based on the treatment the patient is seeking,

§ 2(b)(1) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 543 U.S. 184 (2002)).
130. Id. (noting that one purpose of the amendments is "to carry out the ADA's
objectives of providing 'a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination' and 'clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination' by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available
under the ADA").
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
132. See id. § 12102(1)(A) (2008) (defining disability with respect to an
individual).
133. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 ('The Act addresses substantial
limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.").
134. Id. The Court wrote:
Conception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim but,
without doubt, are dangerous to the public health. This meets the
definition of a substantial limitation. The decision to reproduce carries
economic and legal consequences as well. There are added costs for
antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and long-term health care
for the child who must be examined and, tragic to think, treated for the
infection. The laws of some States, moreover, forbid persons infected with
HIV from having sex with others, regardless of consent.
Id. (citations omitted).
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not the patient's HIV status alone. 135
When a healthcare provider categorically denied fertility
treatment to persons living with HIV, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to argue that such a denial did not violate the ADA. 136
Instead, a physician seeking to avoid providing treatment based on
a patient's HIV status must conduct an individualized analysis of
whether there are appropriate medical reasons to turn that
particular HIV-positive patient away from care. 137
Physicians could argue a lack of expertise in working with
gametes harboring possible HIV infection.
Since the readily
achievable, standard infectious disease protocol is to employ
universal precautions in the handling of all gametes, this asserted
8
lack of expertise would not be a useful ploy for avoiding liability. 13
To justify denying an HIV-positive woman care, a physician
might also claim that providing standard fertility treatments to an
HIV-positive person requires specialized skills.139
However, a

135. DOJ, Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Persons with HIV/AIDS,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/hivqanda.txt. (last visited Apr. 11, 2009)
[hereinafter DOJ, Questions and Answers].
136. The DOJ writes, "Persons with HIV/AIDS will rarely, if ever, pose a direct
threat in the public accommodations context." Id.
137. The DOJ stated:
The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about
the effects of a particular disability; it must be based on an individual
assessment that considers the particular activity and the actual abilities
and disabilities of the individual. The individual assessment must be
based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence.
Id.
138. The CDC has long recommended that facilities use universal precautions
when handling any material that potentially contains HIV. See CDC, Universal
Precautionsfor Prevention of Transmissionof HIV and Other Bloodborne Infections,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/bp-universal-precautions.html;
see
also ASRM Ethics Comm., Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Infertility
Treatment, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 218, 219, 223 (2002), available at
http://www.asrm.org/media/ethics/hivethics ("If standard universal precautions to
prevent infectious disease transmission are taken, the risk of virus transmission to
medical caregivers is very small and, in itself, is not a sufficient reason to deny
reproductive services to HLV.infected individuals and couples."). Others have
urged ART laboratories to go beyond the basics of universal precautions when
dealing with known infected material. See Carole Gilling-Smith, Laboratory Safety
During Assisted Reproduction in Patients with Blood-borne Viruses, 20 HUM.
REPROD. 1433, 1435 (2005) ("Therefore, when treating known infectious cases (or
unscreened samples), we recommend that, over and above universal precautions,
working surfaces and equipment used are cleaned with additional disinfecting
agents, e.g. Virkon, to further minimize potential cross-contamination risk.").
139. Cf. Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 58 (2001) (holding that the defendant
obstetrician's referral of an HIV-positive woman to a hospital with an HIV
program, rather than providing her with care himself, was acceptable).
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person seeking the same treatment that a physician provides to all
other patients would not necessarily need specialized care due to
HIV status because the procedures to be performed are fairly
standard. 140 Artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF),
and other modes of treating infertility are employed the same way
for people living with HIV as they are for any patient.141 A
legitimate issue is whether the facility has the appropriate
equipment to handle gametes that might contaminate other
specimens.142 Some procedures (such as sperm washing) may
require skills, equipment, or lab expertise that a physician does
not have. Even basic storage of gametes might-in some small
minority of cases where universal precautions were somehow
inadequate-present a substantial obstacle to providing care to
people living with HIV.
In cases when a physician or facility lacked the skill or
equipment to properly provide care or store gametes, and when it
would be cost prohibitive to alter the facility, the defendant would
be able to claim that accommodating the needs of the HIV-positive
patient was not readily achievable. 143 In this small subset of
cases, the healthcare provider could legitimately claim that
referral to another physician or facility was appropriate and did
not violate the ADA, either because the patient (or her gametes)
posed a direct threat of transmission to others in the facility 4 4 or
because the physician lacked the necessary skills to provide care
that is not routine.145 Importantly, the claim here is not that the
physician or healthcare workers might contract HIV from the
patient in the context of providing care, but that other patients
may be at risk. 146 Thus, the number of instances in which a

140. See generally ASRM Ethics Comm., supra note 138 (failing to mention a
need to modify procedures in order to care for H1V-positive patients).
141. Id. (noting no differences in treatment for HIV-positive patients).
142. Yvon Englert et al., Medically Assisted Reproduction in the Presence of
Chronic Viral Diseases, 10 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 149, 151-53 (2004) (discussing
techniques to decontaminate sperm samples).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
144. See infra Part IV.C.
145. According to the Federal Regulations:
A health care provider may refer an individual with a disability to another
provider, if that individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or services
outside of the referring provider's area of specialization, and if the
referring provider would make a similar referral for an individual without
a disability who seeks or requires the same treatment or services.
28 CFR § 36.302 (2004).
146. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (holding that a
generalized fear of HIV transmission resulting from providing standard healthcare
treatments was insufficient to satisfy the direct threat requirement).
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healthcare provider could legitimately claim a solid medical reason
for refusing care to a person living with HIV is few.
Alternatively, a fertility specialist who chose not to treat a
person living with HIV could seek safe harbor in the direct threat
provision of the ADA.147 This provision allows a physician to
refuse care when providing such care presents a direct threat to
The unique nature of fertility
the patient or to others. 148
treatment makes this inquiry especially complicated; therefore, I
will address the question of direct threat in Part IV.C.
B. The QuadriplegicPatient
At the age of 23, Michelle Carson became paralyzed after a
devastating car accident. 149 Ms. Carson is a quadriplegic, which
means that she lives her life in a wheelchair. 150 She cannot move
herself in and out of that chair; she cannot feed, bathe, or clothe
herself.15 1 She cannot drive a car. 152 She cannot cook a meal, or
engage in a wide range of actions that would be required in order
for her to live an independent life. 153 She has a husband and
several caregivers who ensure that her physical needs are met.154
A documentary chronicled Carson as she went through her final
weeks of pregnancy, labored to deliver her son, and brought him
home to begin his life as the child of a quadriplegic woman and a
non-quadriplegic man. 155 Due to her disability, her son is washed,
fed, and clothed by others. 15 6 In the documentary, Carson says
she is enjoying holding him on her lap while he is still a newborn
because as soon as he is able to wriggle away from her, she will no
Carson's disability did not
longer be able to hold him. 157
negatively impact her reproductive capacity, and she and her
husband were able to achieve pregnancy without technological
However, if she had needed the aid of ART, it is
assistance.15
certainly possible that some physicians would have preferred not
147. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2004).
148. Id.
149. Paralyzed & Pregnant (Discovery Health Channel 2008), available at
http://health.discovery.com/videos/baby-week-paralyzed-pregnant-part- 1.html and
http://health.discovery.com/videos/baby-week-paralyzed-pregnant-part-2.html.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Id.
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to treat her because of her profound disability.
As described in the previous Section, a physician could not
categorically deny care to women who are quadriplegic, but would
need to make individualized determinations about providing
treatment. 159 A woman denied care by a fertility specialist on the
basis of her status as a quadriplegic would first need to establish
that she is a disabled person as defined by the statute.160 Given
the substantial physical impairment inherent in quadriplegia, this
would not be difficult to establish, even in the face of various
technical advances that make it possible for Ms. Carson and other
quadriplegics to engage in multiple activities. 161 There are so
many things that she cannot do and for which she needs
assistance that she is, without question, disabled under the terms
162
of the statute.
Again, to defeat a claim of illegal discrimination, the fertility
specialist might assert a lack of expertise in working with
quadriplegics as a basis to deny care. 163 As is true with HIV
infection or AIDS, the actual care provided to Ms. Carson would
not be substantially different than that provided to any other
patient. 164 As a quadriplegic, she is at greater risk for some of the
typical complications of pregnancy, but these are complications
with which any qualified obstetrical provider should be able to

159.According to the Federal Regulations:
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized
assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical
knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the
nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential
injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of
policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.
28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (2004).
160. Id. § 36.104.
161. See, e.g., Sci-Info-Pages, Assistive Technology & Adaptive Equipment,
http://www.sci-info-pages.com/adaptive.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2009) (listing
various adaptive technologies for quadriplegics, including communication devices,
hand grips, on-screen keyboards, and scooters).
162. The Act's definition of physical or mental impairment is: "Any physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense
organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."
Id.
§ 36.104(1)(i).
163. See id. § 36.302(b).
164. See generally American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG)
Comm., Opinion No. 275, Obstetric Management of Patients with Spinal Cord
Injuries, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 625, 625-27 (2002) (describing the
specific medical problems presented by pregnant women with spinal cord injuries,
and how these problems should be managed).
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cope. For example, paralyzed pregnant women are at risk for
urinary tract infections, anemia, complications with their
medications, mobility issues requiring bed rest, and delivery
complications necessitating a cesarean section. 16 5 Any qualified
obstetrical provider would be able to deal with these routine types
To the extent that there are specific
of complications. 166
relevant
to women with spinal cord injuries, the
complications
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists stresses the
importance of becoming acquainted with problems related to
spinal cord injuries that can occur during pregnancy, but the
organization does not intimate that only specialized providers can
appropriately care for such women. 167 Further, the level of
obstetrical care is an issue to be determined between the pregnant
woman and her healthcare provider once she achieves
pregnancy.1 66 Therefore, the claim of inadequate skill or expertise
would not be a strong one.
As is true in the case of HIV, then, the final refuge of a
physician seeking to avoid helping a quadriplegic woman achieve
pregnancy would be the direct threat provisions of the ADA.169
Part IV will examine the concept of direct threat and how it could
be used as a defense against women with HIV or quadriplegia in a
claimed ADA violation.
IV. Threatening Pregnancies and Threatening Parents
There are multiple concerns in a discussion about what it
means for a potential parent to pose a direct threat to herself or to
her children, such that it would be appropriate to deny her access
to fertility services. First, is there anything about the fertility
treatment itself that poses a threat to the patient's health?
Second, is there anything about a pregnancy that poses a direct

165. See CenterSite.net, Pregnancy-Special Considerations: Heart Disease,
Paralysis,Obesity,
http://www.centersite.net/poc/view-doc.php?type=doc&id=6151&cn=282
(last visited Apr. 11, 2009); see also JUDITH ROGERS, THE DISABLED WOMAN'S
GUIDE TO PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 50 (Demos Medical Publishing 2006) (1991)

(describing pregnancy complications that can arise in women with spinal cord
injuries).
166. See Am. Bd. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.abog.org/faq.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (detailing the training and
certification of an obstetrician-gynecologist).
167. See ACOG Comm., supra note 164, at 625 ("It is important that
obstetricians caring for such patients acquaint themselves with the problems
relating to SCIs [spinal cord injuries] that may occur throughout pregnancy.").
168. See id.
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 36.208 (2004).
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threat to the patient or to the fetus? Third, is there anything
about the parent that poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or
welfare of the future child? It is this last question that is
potentially most contentious and least amenable to medical or
scientific scrutiny, as it squarely confronts the role of the fertility
provider in determining who is fit to parent.
The previous Parts identified some of the threshold issues
inherent in disability discrimination claims regarding the
provision of fertility treatment. For women living with HIV or
quadriplegia, at first glance the ADA appears to provide protection
from discrimination. 170 The unique nature of the goal of fertility
treatment, however, warrants a more nuanced evaluation of
whether the ADA's direct threat provisions can be used to protect
a physician who chooses not to provide fertility care to women with
significant disabilities.
The direct threat provisions of the ADA allow a physician to
lawfully refuse care to a patient when the patient poses a direct
threat to others, 171 or where providing the care would pose a direct
threat to the patient. 172 A direct threat is "a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others
be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
that cannot
accommodation."' 173 Direct threat determinations must be based
on an "individualized assessment" of the patient's present ability
to receive the service, and that assessment must rely on "the most
current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective
evidence."' 174 Those charged with evaluating a direct threat claim
will consider four factors: "(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the
nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that
the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the
potential harm."'175 Physicians must consider any reasonable
accommodations that would eliminate the risk of harm or reduce it

170. See discussion supra Part III.
171. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648 (1998) ("[P]etitioner could
have refused to treat her if her infectious condition 'pose[d] a direct threat to health
or safety of others."' (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(3) (West 2008))).
172. See, e.g., Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F.Supp. 1461, 1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ('The
legality of the defendant's medical decision not to treat plaintiff therefore depends
on whether the cosmetic surgery actually posed a 'direct threat' to plaintiffs
health.").
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2008).
174. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES

(1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)(1)-(4).
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to an acceptable level.176
Importantly, the direct threat
determination must be based on "objective, factual evidence-not
on subjective perceptions, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes,
or stereotypes-about the nature or effect of a particular disability
177
or of disability generally."
Given this guidance, direct threat evaluations must be made
to minimize the denial of services based on irrational fear and
stereotypes, yet to allow care to be refused when objective evidence
warrants that refusal. While a physician might lawfully refuse to
perform surgery on an HIV-positive patient whose disease puts
her at greater risk for post-surgical complications 178 (a threat to
the patient), a physician could not refuse to operate on that same
patient based on an unfounded fear that the patient's disease will
somehow be spread to others during surgery 179 (a readily reducible
risk to others).
Evaluating the threat-to-self claims that could be made in the
context of disability suggests that such claims should largely fail.
Taking each disability example in turn, pregnancy presents
inimitable challenges for an HIV-positive woman and has been
found, in some circumstances, to compromise a woman's health. 180
Other sources, however, suggest that pregnancy can actually
improve the health of an HIV-positive woman.181 It is irrefutably
the case that thousands of HIV-positive women have given birthmost of them to healthy children-since the start of the epidemic,
and it cannot be conclusively shown that pregnancy severely
compromises the life span of an HIV-positive woman.18 2 Even if
pregnancy was detrimental, arguably the decision whether to risk
a shortened life span in the interest of having biological children is
a choice to be made by the woman seeking pregnancy, and not by a
176. Id. § 1630.9 (describing the "reasonable accommodations" requirements).
177. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App., § 1630.2(r) (2008).
178. See, e.g., Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F.Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that a
doctor's belief that the requested surgery was a threat to the patient's health was a
nondiscriminatory reason for refusal).
179. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (finding that a refusal
to perform surgery must be based on "objective, scientific information").
180. See Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Jean Anderson, Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and Assisted Reproduction: Reconsidering Evidence, Reframing Ethics, 75
FERTILITY & STERILITY 843, 847 (2001) (describing the "increased risk of certain
pregnancy complications" in HIV-infected mothers).
181. See Jennifer H. Tai et al., Pregnancy and HIV Disease ProgressionDuring
the Era of Highly Active AntiretroviralTherapy, 196 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1044,
1051 (2007) ("Our data suggest that, in a setting with high rates of HAART use,
pregnancy is independently associated with a decreased risk of HIV disease
progression.").
182. Id.
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physician.18 3 Thus, while a fertility specialist could choose not to
assist an HIV-positive woman for fear that her pregnancy would
pose undue risk to her own health, the claim of direct threat to the
patient is specious at best and subterfuge to conceal illegal
discrimination at worst.
The direct-threat-to-self claim also falters in the case of
quadriplegic women. Such pregnancies entail risks, as do all
pregnancies,1 8 4 but those risks can be well managed by obstetrical
providers, thus negating a plausible claim of direct-threat-to-self.
The quadriplegic woman may require a more exacting level of
monitoring than would a woman without such a disability, but the
same is true for women who are diabetic, over the age of thirtyfive, or have a history of miscarriages.1 85 Thus, the argument of
direct-threat-to-self is a poor one for fertility providers who are
hoping to avoid caring for women with substantial physical
disabilities.
Although the direct-threat-to-self argument does not hold up
well to scrutiny, it does not automatically mean that healthcare
providers should have no right or responsibility to think critically
about the potential harm to women inherent in some choices about
pursuing pregnancy. Increasingly, fertility providers are being
urged to take greater care in helping to create pregnancies that
pose untoward risks to pregnant woman and their fetuses or to
future children. 188 Certainly, the miracle-working physician who
blithely helps women become pregnant with literal litters of
children,1 8 7 or pats himself on the back for helping a
183. See Lyerly & Anderson, supra note 180, at 849 (describing the problematic
nature of policies limiting the reproductive choices of HIV-infected women).
184. See CenterSite.net, supra note 165 ("Paralyzed pregnant women face the
same normal array of pregnancy complications as do other women. However, the
likelihood that these complications will occur is higher in paralyzed women than in
other women.").
185. See U.S. Nat'l Library of Med. and NIH, Medline Plus Health Topics,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/highriskpregnancy.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2009) (noting various conditions that create a high-risk pregnancy situation,
including being pregnant with more than one baby, previous problem pregnancies,
or being over 35).
186. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen & Doug Gross, Georgia 'Octomom Bill' Would
Limit Embryo Implants, CNN, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009fUS/03/03/georgia.octomom.bill/index.html
(describing efforts currently being undertaken to limit multiple births due to in
vitro fertilization).
187. See, e.g., Maggie Michael, Egyptian Woman Gives Birth To Septuplets, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 16, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/16/egyptian-woman-givesbirtn_119327.html (reporting that in August 2008, Ghazala Khamis, a twentyseven-year-o1d Egyptian woman who already had three children, gave birth to
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seventy-year-old woman bear twins,1ss has crossed an ethical line
and made medically questionable decisions that society and the
profession should not support or imitate.18 9 This is particularly so
because many fertility specialists transfer care for patients to an
obstetrician once a pregnancy is well established, generally after
the first trimester. 190 As such, the pregnant patient's health is
primarily the concern not of the fertility specialist, but of the
physician who will provide the care leading to the birth of the
child. The fertility specialist, because he is responsible only for
creating a pregnancy, logically has less of a claim to the protection
provided to those helping a pregnant woman maintain her own
health and that of her fetus over the course of a pregnancy. There
are valid reasons for providers to be cautious and thoughtful about
how and to whom they provide services. The basis of their caution,
however, should be solid medicine and science, rather than
amorphous and misguided judgments about risk.
The direct threat provisions also refer to threats to others, 91
and it is in this capacity that physicians might have a stronger
argument for refusing to provide care to significantly disabled
women. For HIV-positive people, the risks inherent in procreating

septuplets as a result of taking fertility drugs). In February 2009, Nadya Suleman,
a single mother of 6, gave birth to octuplets after undergoing IVF. See, e.g.,
Caplan, supra note 45 (describing Suleman's situation). These cases, and others
like them, have been at the center of international debates about the ethics of
fertility practice. Id.
188. See Another 70-year-old in India has IVF Baby, MSNBC, Dec. 8, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28112285 (reporting the birth of a girl to a woman
who had been trying for 50 years to become pregnant).
189. See, e.g., Eike-Henner Kiuge, Reproductive Technology and Postmenopausal
Motherhood, 151 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 353, 353-55 (1994) (making the ethical
case for excluding post-menopausal women from access to assisted reproductive
technology); Darshak Sanghavi, Pregnant Pause, Who Should Pay for In Vitro
Fertilization?, SLATE, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2211151/ (proposing
mandated infertility coverage as financially more sound than the current U.S.
system).
190. K. B. Copperman et al., Patients' Return to Referring Physicians for
Obstetrical Care is Related to the Duration of Their Infertility, 82 FERTILITY &
STERILITY (SuPP. 2) S101 (2004) ("A patient referred by an obstetrician/gynecologist
is routinely encouraged by the reproductive endocrinologist to return to the
referring physician for prenatal care and delivery.").
191. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(3).
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term 'direct
threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
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are fairly simple to delineate and, with the proper access to
treatment, can be significantly reduced. The first "other" to whom
an HIV-positive person presents a direct threat is the sexual
partner with whom that person would have unprotected sexual
intercourse in order to create a pregnancy. HIV-positive people
have several options to avoid the risk of sexual transmission of
HIV while trying to achieve pregnancy. For an HIV-positive man,
without the use of fertility treatment, having unprotected sex with
an HIV-negative partner puts both the partner and the fetus at
risk. 92 Fertility treatment can avoid such risk in several ways.
First, prior to artificial insemination, sperm can be washed to
substantially reduce the risk of HIV transmission. 193 That sperm
can also be used to create embryos outside of the body through
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) 194 and IVF, which
eliminates the risk of HIV transmission between sexual
partners. 195 An HIV-positive woman and her HIV-negative male
partner could also choose artificial insemination to eliminate the
risk of transmitting the virus between partners during
96
unprotected sexual intercourse. 1
192. See D. Hollander, Risk of HIV Transmission is Raised by High Viral Load,
Presence of Genital Ulcers, 27 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 156 (2001) (noting that one
study found that "[o]n average, each time a monogamous, heterosexual couple in
which one partner is HIV-positive has intercourse, the probability that the virus
will be transmitted to the uninfected partner is 0.11%" and that the risk of
transmission increases with the viral load of the infected partner); see generally
CDC, How is HIV Passedfrom One Person to Another?,
http://cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qal6.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (stating that
heterosexual sexual activity is a primary mode of HIV transmission).
193. See James D. M. Nicopoullos et al., The Effect of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus on Sperm Parameters and the Outcome of Intrauterine Insemination
Following Sperm Washing, 19 HuM. REPROD. 2289, 2289 (2004) (describing the
technique of sperm washing in which sperm is rid of "seminal plasma and nonsperm cells before insemination into the woman at the time of ovulation"); see also
Sauer, supra note 78, at 33 (noting that studies indicate that sperm washing is a
successful technique for avoiding HIV transmission in sero-discordant couples, and
stating that "[t]he implementation of sperm-preparation techniques, popularly
referred to as 'sperm washing,' appears to reduce the probability of horizontal
transmission and has been recommended for nearly ten years as a means for HIV-1
serodiscordant couples to have a child" (citation omitted)).
194. See ASRM, Patient Fact Sheet: Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI),
available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheetsICSI-Fact.pdf.
195. See Sauer, supra note 78, at 34.
196. See, e.g., ASRM Ethics Comm., supra note 138 ("If a woman is HIV positive
and her male partner is HIV negative, transmission of infection to the male partner
can be avoided by using homologous insemination with the partner's sperm.");
Lyerly & Anderson, supra note 180 ("When the woman is HIV infected and the
male partner HIV uninfected, the use of artificial insemination should be
encouraged. Home artificial insemination techniques can be easily taught and
provide protection for the H1V-uninfected partner, who should continue to use
condoms with each act of intercourse.").
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For purposes of this Article, the more critical direct threat
question focuses on the risk to the future fetus or future child, and
this risk is the focus of the Sections that follow.
A. Hypothetical People and Hypothetical Risks
A fascinating aspect of the relationship between the ADA and
disability discrimination in the context of fertility treatment is
how the unique nature of fertility treatment creates conceptual
difficulties that do not exist in the context of any other type of
medical care. Fertility treatment is the only type of medical care
in which the end goal is the creation of another person. This is
distinct even from obstetrical care, in which a pregnancy already
exists and the healthcare provider takes on the relationship with
the understanding that she has obligations to both the pregnant
woman and the fetus that she carries. 197 Obstetricians often
speak of having two patients rather than one, and many people
are comfortable with this formulation, even if they disagree on
how the physician and the law should balance the interests of the
8
pregnant woman and the fetus.19
A fertility doctor's claim that she has two patients, the
pregnant woman and any future child, is significantly more
tenuous, though this claim would form the bulk of a direct-threatto-others defense in the context of an ADA claim. The argument
would require a court to determine the status of a fetus as a
person and the role of fertility providers in acting as protectors of
future children. 199
B. The Question of Risk
As is true when assessing a potential risk to the patient, the
200
evaluation of a direct-threat-to-others claim is a four-part test.
First, is the harm posed by the patient in question serious in
nature or severity?201 Second, is the risk temporary and fleeting,

197. See, e.g., ACOG Comm. on Ethics, Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and
the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127, 1127 (2005) (discussing the tension
between a pregnant woman's right to make medical decisions and fetal harm).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that the unborn are
not persons under the Constitution); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn.
1992) (holding that the pre-embryos in dispute in the case were not persons under
Tennessee law, though they were entitled to special consideration different from
property).
200. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (2004).
201. Id.
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or could it endure for a significant period of time? 20 2 Third, how
203
great is the likelihood that the threatened harm will occur?
Where the harm is a substantial one, this factor is less important
to the end calculus. 20 4 Fourth, and finally, is the harm imminent;
20 5
in other words, how suddenly might it occur?
The risks to a fetus carried by a disabled woman can be
defined as direct and indirect risks. Direct risks are those that
would result in transmitting the parent's disability to the child, or
the risk of an adverse pregnancy outcome that is directly linked to
the pregnant woman's disability, such as complications leading to
fetal death or a child's disability. Both vertical transmission of
HIV and transmitting genes that create disability fall into the
direct risk category. Indirect risks are those that could affect the
child post-birth as a result of how the parental disability affects
the ability to parent. For instance, a child may be neglected as a
result of a parent being too sick to care for her. These two types of
risk, even to the extent that each could have deleterious
consequences for the future child, should be evaluated separately
as bases for denying fertility care to disabled women.
C. Direct Risk
For the fetus carried by an HIV-positive woman, there is a
direct risk of vertical (mother-to-child) transmission of HIV during
gestation, birth, or during a period of breastfeeding. 2 6 Where
treatment is accessible, physicians strongly urge women to engage
in a course of antiretroviral therapy during pregnancy, labor, and
post-birth in order for the baby to be at a substantially lower risk
of such transmission. 20 7 Without intervention, the risk of vertical
transmission hovers around 25%.208
With various medical
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. NIH, HIV Infection in Infants and Children,
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/HIVAIDS/Understanding/Population+Specific+Inf
ormationlchildren.htm# (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter NIH, HIV in
Children] ("Almost all HIV-infected children acquire the virus from their mothers
before or during birth or through breastfeeding.").
207. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USES OF
ANTIRETROVIRAL DRUGS IN PREGNANT HIV-INFECTED WOMEN FOR MATERNAL
HEALTH AND INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE PERINATAL HLV TRANSMISSION IN THE

UNITED STATES 3 (2008), available at
http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/PerinatalGL.pdlf (explaining that there are also
treatment protocols that can reduce the risk of transmission of HIV from mother to
child).
208. NIH, H1V in Children, supra note 206 ("In the United States,
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interventions, such as antiretroviral therapy and elective
cesarean sections, the risk of vertical transmission falls to less
than 2%.209 In settings where formula is readily available, public
health authorities also urge HIV-positive women not to breastfeed
210
their children.
Thus, a physician faced with such patients could argue that
any direct risk of transmitting disease or substantial disability,
slight or great, justifies a refusal to provide care because creating
such a pregnancy unfairly places the future child in harm's way.
The physician could not make general statements about risk, but
would need to satisfy the appropriate test for evaluating direct
211
threats in the context of providing medical care.
First, it cannot be denied that the harm involved in vertical
transmission of HIV is serious in both nature and severity as it
involves a child forced to live with, and potentially die from, a
chronic and life-threatening illness. 212 The child would be at risk
for serious opportunistic infections as well as significant side
effects from treatment. 21 3 Thus, vertical transmission of HIV
approximately 25 percent of pregnant HIV-infected women not receiving AZT
therapy have passed on the virus to their babies.").
209. Id. As the NIH explains:
In 1994, a landmark study conducted by the PACTG [Pediatric AIDS
Clinical Trials Group] demonstrated that AZT, given to HIV-infected
women who had very little or no prior antiretroviral therapy and CD4+
T-cell counts above 200/mm 3, reduced the risk of MTCT [mother to child
transmission] by two-thirds, from 25 percent to 8 percent. In the study,
AZT therapy was initiated in the second or third trimester and continued
during labor, and infants were treated for 6 weeks following birth. AZT
produced no serious side effects in mothers or infants. Long-term follow
up of the infants and mothers is ongoing. A few years later, another
PACTG study found that the risk of transmitting HIV from an HIVpositive mother to her newborn infant could be reduced to 1.5 percent in
those women who received antiretroviral treatment and appropriate
medical and obstetrical care during pregnancy.
Id.
210. Id. ("In countries where safe alternatives to breastfeeding are readily
available and economically feasible, this alternative should be encouraged.').
211. Id. (defining "direct threat" and the criteria to assess whether an individual
poses a direct threat).
212. See Working Group on Antiretroviral Therapy and Med. Mgmt. of HIVInfected Children, Guidelinesfor the Use of AntiretroviralAgents in PediatricHIV
Infection, availableat http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/PediatricGuidelines.pdf
(describing the diagnosis and treatment of HIV infection in children); see generally
Nat'l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, HIV Infection in Infants and
Children, available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/hivchildren.htm (noting
the dangers of HIV infection in children and infants).
213. See Working Group on Guidelines for the Prevention and Treatment of
Opportunistic Infections Among HIV-Exposed and HIV-Infected Children,
Guidelines for Preventionand Treatment of OpportunisticInfections among
HIV-Exposed and HIV-Infected Children, availableat
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satisfies the first prong of the ADA's direct threat test.
The temporal question of risk is more difficult to quantify,
but it seems that vertical transmission would satisfy this prong of
the test as well. The risk of transmission can be described as
existing within the period of pregnancy and childbirth, with an
additional risk of transmission during breastfeeding. 214 Therefore,
the risk itself exists within a relatively fixed time period, and it is
not fleeting. Importantly, however, the potential for transmission
within that fixed time period can be substantially reduced by the
treatment choices of the pregnant woman. 215 This leads to the
next inquiry, which is the likelihood that the threatened harm will
come to fruition. Even an HIV-positive woman with an optimal
pre-pregnancy health status (meaning a low viral load, no
opportunistic infections, and access to state-of-the-art medications)
risks transmitting HIV during pregnancy, childbirth, or post-birth
through breastfeeding. 216 Without treatment during pregnancy
and childbirth, the risk of transmission hovers around 25%.217
These risks, other than those posed by breastfeeding, cannot be
completely eliminated, but they can be reduced to an
When treated based on CDC
extraordinarily modest level. 218
pregnant
woman
has an
guidelines,
an
HIV-positive
219
approximately 1-2% risk of transmitting her infection to a child.
However, the harm, if it comes to fruition, is substantial and
weakens the importance of this factor to the overall analysis of
direct threat.
Finally, the imminence of harm presents a difficult question.
If the harm to the child is the transmission of HIV, then it is hard
to argue that the harm is imminent simply by virtue of a woman
with HIV being pregnant, given that the exact mechanism of
transmission is not entirely clear, and that transmission could
happen along a continuum from pregnancy, through childbirth, to
post-birth. 220 Thus, while the harm is real, it is not clear that it is
imminent in the way that that word is generally understood.

http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/currentfiles/PediatricOl.pdf
214. See CDC, Achievements in Public Health: Reduction in Perinatal
Transmissionof HIV Infection-UnitedStates, 1985-2005, MMWR WEEKLY, June 6,
2006, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5521a3.htm (stating that
"[t]ransmission can occur during pregnancy, labor, delivery, or breast feeding").
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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To justify a direct risk claim, a physician could certainly
marshal evidence that a direct risk exists, that it is significant,
and that it could happen within a relatively compressed time
frame. However, the physician would also have to contend with
the reality that medical treatment can substantially reduce,
although not wholly eliminate, risks to the pregnant woman and to
her future child. 221 Part of the argument against allowing such
discrimination is that in any pregnancy, there is some risk of
adverse outcomes for the fetus. Every year in the United States
about 3% of babies will be born with some birth anomaly. 222 Given
that risk exists in any pregnancy, it is a weak argument that a 1%
risk of HIV transmission is of such weight that it should justify
refusing care to an HIV-positive woman.
In other realms, specifically criminal law, arguments about
minimal or infinitesimal risk have not protected HIV-positive
people from adverse legal outcomes. HIV-positive people have
been successfully prosecuted for behavior such as spitting or
throwing other bodily fluids that present either no risk or an
extraordinarily slight risk of HIV transmission. 223 Arguably,
however, the standard utilized by criminal courts should have no
relevance in the discrimination context. First, criminal cases may
involve conduct in which a person actually hoped to transmit HIV
to another person, despite the fact that he or she was practically
incapable of doing so. 224 This type of intent or reckless disregard
would not be present in the case of a woman seeking pregnancy.225

221. Id.
222. See CDC, Birth Defects: Frequently-Asked Questions,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbdddfbd/faql.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
223. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 A.2d 429, 431-32 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (upholding criminal assault and reckless endangerment convictions for an
HIV-positive inmate who flung fecal matter on a corrections officer). The CDC does
not require that universal precautions be taken with feces or saliva, unless the
saliva is or could be contaminated with blood. See CDC, supranote 138.
224. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 517-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1993) (upholding attempted murder, aggravated assault, and terroristic threats
convictions for an HIV-positive inmate who threatened to kill a corrections officer
by spitting and biting).
225. People living with HIV, just like those who do not have the disease, desire
to create families with children. Data indicates that "[ailmost one-third of
HIV-infected men and women receiving medical care in the US desire children in
the future. Furthermore, 20% of serodiscordant couples would practice unsafe sex
in order to conceive."

A GUIDE TO THE CLINICAL CARE OF WOMEN WITH HIV 241

(Jean R. Anderson ed., 2005), availableat
http://hab.hrsa.gov/publications/womencare5lWGO5chap7.htm#WGO5chap7a
(citations omitted). Given this desire, there is nothing surprising about people with
HIV seeking pregnancy and there is no reason to think that an HIV-positive
woman would actively seek to infect a child with HLV. In fact, the substantial drop
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Second, not only would there not be any malicious behavior on the
part of the woman seeking pregnancy, it may actually be the case
that she is participating in fertility treatment precisely to avoid
the transmission of HIV. Thus, while there might be public health
concerns about HIV transmission from mother to child or between
people who are sexually involved, references to criminal conduct
are completely misplaced when discussing people who are seeking
to build families.
A concern about vertical transmission would be stronger
when a prospective fertility patient indicates that she will not take
the recommended drugs during pregnancy, or makes clear an
intention to breastfeed in spite of strong recommendations against
it. These cases would likely be exceedingly rare, but would include
women who have legitimate concerns about the undetermined
long-term consequences of participating in an HIV drug regimen
during pregnancy. 226 This unease could be reinforced by the fact
that the vast majority of children will not contract HIV from their
mothers, even if the pregnant woman takes no medication during
227
her pregnancy.
Even so, it is unclear that these scenarios would create a risk
significant enough to protect the physician from a claim of
It would be useful to compare the
unlawful discrimination.
physician's practice in the context of other known risks to a
potential fetus. A physician who does not discriminate against
people with the potential to pass on other deadly illnesses such as
Tay-Sachs-which is inheritable, cannot be cured, and inevitably
leads to an early death-has no plausible argument to justify not
treating an HIV-positive woman, who poses an equal or even
lesser risk of transmitting an illness that, while life-threatening,
in the number of children infected with HIV by their mothers can be attributed in
part to the widespread use of antiretrovirals by pregnant women to reduce the risk
of HIV transmission to their newborns. CDC, Mother-to-Child (Perinatal)HIV

Transmissionand Prevention, Oct. 2007,
http://cdc.gov/hiv/topics/perinatal/resources/factsheets/perinatal.htm.
226. PERINATAL HIV GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE OF ANTIRETROVIRAL DRUGS IN PREGNANT
HIV-INFECTED WOMEN FOR MATERNAL HEALTH AND INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE

PERINATAL HIV TRANSMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES 59-60 (U.S. Dept. of Health
& Human Servs. 2008) (2007), available at
http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/PerinatalGL.pdf (concluding that the data is
insufficient to determine the long-term risk for neoplasia or organ system toxicities
in children that have been exposed to antiretroviral drugs in utero).

227. CDC, Pregnancy and Childbirth,
http://cdc.gov/hiv/topics/perinatal/index.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (stating that
the risk of vertical transmission without antiretroviral treatment or breastfeeding
is 25%).

2009]

DISABLING DREAMS

can be treated. 228 Even if a child does contract HIV from her
mother, her potential for extended life is greater than that of a
229
child born with Tay-Sachs.
Thus, the risk of HIV transmission to a child is difficult to
quantify and, even when quantifiable, does not necessarily justify
refusing care in all cases. 230 In such a case, a physician certainly
would be justified in gathering more information from the patient
and perhaps referring her to other sources, including specialists in
HIV and pregnancy, in order to help her understand her own
disease and the risk of transmission to a child. Only where a
woman continued to assert no interest in taking steps to reduce
the risk of transmission would a physician be justified in refusing
care, and then only if such care would be denied to any person who
posed a similar threshold of risk to a child.231

228. Tay-Sachs is a fatal disorder, the incidence of which is particularly high
among people of Eastern European and Askhenazi Jewish descent. Office of
Commc'ns. & Pub. Liaison, Nat'l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, NINDS
Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm
(last visited Mar. 9,
2009). Children afflicted with Tay-Sachs generally die by the age of 4, even when
offered the best possible treatment. Id. Both parents must carry the Tay-Sachs
gene in order to produce a child with Tay-Sachs. Id. When both parents carry the
gene, the risk of creating a child who will have Tay-Sachs is 20%. Id.
229. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases reports that:
Researchers have observed two general patterns of illness in HJV-infected
children. About 20 percent of children develop serious disease in the first
year of life; most of these children die by age 4. The remaining 80 percent
of infected children have a slower rate of disease progression, many not
developing the most serious symptoms of AIDS until school entry or even
adolescence. A report from a large European registry of HIV-infected
children indicated that half of the children with perinatally acquired
HIV disease were alive at age nine. Another study of 42 perinatally HIVinfected children, who survived beyond 9 years of age, found about
one-quarter of the children to be asymptomatic with relatively intact
immune systems.
Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, HIV Infection in Infants and Children,
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/hivchildren.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
230. While far from the outcome of choice, the child welfare system exists
specifically to deal with questions of risks to born children, but has been known to
seek control over the choices of pregnant women in the interest of protecting a
fetus. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) (ordering a cesarean section against the wishes of a competent pregnant
woman); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.
1964) (allowing court-ordered blood transfusions for a pregnant Jehovah's Witness).
As such, the fertility provider is not the last line of defense when it comes to the
interests of a fetus or child.
231. When a potential fertility patient living with HIV possesses 'lifestyle
risks ... which may compromise parental competence andlor jeopardize the welfare
of the child, such as non-compliance to HIV treatment," physicians may ethically
refuse to work with the patient. F. Shenfield et al., Taskforce 8: Ethics of Medically
Assisted Fertility Treatment for HIV Positive Men and Women, 19 HUM. REPROD.
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As for a woman living with quadriplegia, the direct risk
evaluation will generally be easier. Any woman who became
quadriplegic as a result of a spinal cord injury certainly would not
be capable of transmitting that injury to a child. The condition
can also be caused by a disease of the spinal canal, including polio
or spina bifida, 232 but the transmissibility issues here are more
While polio is very contagious, it is
difficult to quantify.
exceedingly rare in this country, and because of immunization,
seldom leads to paralysis. 233 There is no known cause of spina
bifida, so it would be impossible to blame the pregnant woman if
she bears a child with this birth defect. 234 It is the case, then, that
even though quadriplegia can be understood as harm to an
individual living with the condition, 235 the person does not
generally pose a threat to others in any appreciable way, in terms
of being able to transfer her quadriplegia or its underlying cause
to another. Thus, a woman with quadriplegia cannot be said to
pose a direct risk to offspring.
D. Indirect Risk
Risk can also be understood as a claim that an individual's
disability makes her more prone to substandard parenting. In this
case, the risk to the child is that she will be born to a parent who
2454, 2456 (2004); see also, Zutlevics, supra note 98, at 1959 (noting that even if a
child is born HIV-positive, "it is possible [for the child] to live a life of quality for
many years in a way that is precluded by Tay-Sachs").
232. Patricia Tatman, Youth and Spinal Cord Injuries, INCLUSIVE 4-H (2005),
https://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/wyo4h/Inclusive/spinal%20cord.pdf
available at
(defining spinal cord injury and describing the various types).
233. CDC, Polio Disease-Questionsand Answers,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/polio/dis-faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2009)
(describing polio symptoms and presenting its incidence in the U.S.).
234. Doctors believe that spina bifida results from a combination of
environmental and genetic factors, including low levels of folic acid. Mayo Found.
for Med. Edu. & Research, Spina Bifida, http://www.mayoclinic.com/healthspinabifida/DS00417/DSECTION=causes (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). However, the
precise causal mechanism of this disabling condition remains a mystery. Id.
235. A medical model of disability focuses on disability as a "biological problem
or limitation" and uses language that reinforces "negativity" about the lives of
disabled people. Marsha Saxton, Why Members of the Community Oppose Prenatal
Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING & DISABILITY RIGHTS 147,

149 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). In contrast to the medical model,
the disability paradigm fostered by people living with disabilities:
regards disability as a socially constructed phenomenon and is based on a
view of disabled people as a minority group, much like women or persons
of color targeted with social discrimination and denied full access to the
mainstream life of the community. According to this perspective, once the
oppression is revealed, the assumptions of the medical view (the more
impaired, the less quality of life) are exposed as false.
Id. at 150.
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is incapable of providing her with conditions of care that are in the
child's best interest. 236 An HIV-positive parent is at risk for early
death and perhaps an extended period of deterioration that her
child will be forced to witness. 237 However, with the availability of
HAART, among other factors, people with HIV are living longer
and healthier lives. 238 A parent may also find it hard to nurture239a
relationship with a child when dealing with her own illness.
The future child might be subject to disruption, distress, and other
unwanted and potentially destructive experiences and emotions.
The quadriplegic mom poses a risk to her child by virtue of her
physical limitations, necessitating significant assistance with the
physical demands of caretaking for a child. 240 A physician might
be reluctant to help a woman achieve pregnancy who will never be
able to rock her child in her arms, change his diaper, or teach him
how to ride a bike. Further, there is a risk that the child will bear
an unfair burden of caretaking for his mother. These hypothetical
children may also endure social ostracism, teasing, and judgment
based on their mothers' disabilities. Overall, this indirect risk
assessment examines how a parent's disability could make her a
less desirable parent, either because of her own limitations, or the
limitations of a society that provides so poorly for the needs of
236. See generally CDC, Living with HIV/AIDS,
http://www.cdc.govlhiv/resources[brochuresllivingwithhiv.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2009) (explaining the diseases that HIV-positive people are prone to developing).
237. People living with HIV may experience a latency period for ten or more
years before they begin to experience significant symptoms associated with their
infection. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, HIV/AIDS: Symptoms,
(last
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hiv-aids/DS00005/DSECTION=symptoms
visited Mar. 9, 2009). As the disease progresses, people living with HIV and then
AIDS may have any of the following symptoms: swollen lymph nodes, diarrhea,
weight loss, fever, cough and shortness of breath, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
(PCP), soaking night sweats, persistent white spots or unusual lesions on the
tongue or in the mouth, headaches, blurred and distorted vision, and persistent,
unexplained fatigue. Id. People living with AIDS may also develop specific cancers
such as Kaposi's sarcoma, cervical cancer, and lymphoma. Id.
238. John Henkel, Attacking AIDS with a 'Cocktail' Therapy, FDA CONSUMER,
July-Aug. 1999, at 12, available at
(reporting that HAART
http://www.fda.gov/FDAC/features/1999/499_aids.html
helped "the domestic AIDS death rate drop by 47 percent in 1997").
239. See, e.g., Mark A. Schuster et al., Hugs and Kisses: HIV.Infected Parents'
Fears About Contagion and the Effects on Parent-ChildInteraction in a Nationally
Representative Sample, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 173, 179
(2005) (describing the fears of some HIV-positive parents about transmitting HIV
to their children through casual contact or contracting an opportunistic infection
from interacting with their own children).
240. For instance, a parent who was incapable of using her arms due to a
disabling condition would need assistance conducting the basic caretaking
functions for a baby, such as changing diapers, preparing and holding a bottle, or
placing the child in a crib.
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disabled people.
As a threshold matter, it is unlikely that indirect risks to
future children were on the minds of the members of Congress who
passed the ADA. 24 1 A basic understanding of a direct threat,
which was likely Congress's focus, appears to contemplate
relationships and risks between and among actual individuals,
such as a doctor and patient or an employer and employees, as
opposed to risks capable of coming to fruition only in the context of
242
a pregnancy, birth, and period of parenting.
Even if parenting quality is defined by the statute as a risk,
it seems clear that if physicians have any right to judge the future
parenting capabilities of a person living with a disability, they
should, at most, seek to evaluate whether the potential parent can
meet some minimum threshold of acceptability.
Within the
context of child welfare and the parental choices or abilities
subject to State interference, the appropriate standard for
evaluating parental fitness is not whether a parent is the best
available caregiver, but is whether she can provide an adequatenot an outstanding, or even a very good-level of parental care. 243
While it would be wonderful to ask every parent to be the best
caretaker possible, that standard simply cannot be reconciled with
an individual's fundamental right to the care and custody of her
children. 244 Thus, it seems appropriate that if fertility providers
have the power to deny potential parents, their standards for
doing so should be no more stringent than the standards for
removing an existing child from the care of its parents.
There are several rationales that physicians might use to
protect their interest in refusing care to disabled patients who

241. Indeed, the Senate thought of the public accommodations section of the
ADA as remedying the problem of isolation. That is, the bill was designed to
provide physical access to public spaces for people with disabilities, to promote "full
participation" in society. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 10-12 (1989).
242. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2008) (specifying that nothing in the ADA "require[s] a
public accommodation to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of that
public accommodation when that individual poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others").
243. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). According to the court:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.
Id. (citation omitted).
244. See id.; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "[w]ithout doubt... not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right ... [to] establish a home and bring up children").
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present indirect risks of future "bad" parenting or parenting that
somehow fails to meet a minimum threshold of acceptability.
While States are not primarily in the business of evaluating
parental fitness, the fact that state laws mandate that physicians
and other healthcare providers report suspected abuse or neglect
of children suggests both a societal interest in protecting children
and a belief that physicians are in a unique position to see and
judge potential risks to children. 245 While this might be so, the
physician's role need not translate into a broader power to judge
prospective parents' future parenting skills with a crystal ball
approach. Further, when a physician reports abuse or neglect of
an existing child, the state child welfare system has an obligation
to investigate the claim in a manner that protects the rights and
interests of both parents and children. 246 When fertility providers
imagine a future of abuse or neglect before a woman even has the
chance to become pregnant, there are no such checks on the use of
Like physicians, teachers are also under a
the system.247
statutory mandate to report suspected abuse or neglect, but no one
could seriously claim that it would be fair or constitutional to
allow teachers to screen potential parents to avoid the risk of
future abuse or neglect of a child. 248 Thus, while society does
assume that some professionals, including teachers and
physicians, have a duty to children above that of many other
professions, the power to effectuate that duty is rightly limited.
Furthermore, if providers are making judgments about
245. According to the federal government, 48 states and the District of Columbia
require various groups of professionals, including physicians, teachers, social
workers, and child care providers, to report suspected abuse or neglect of child.
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 1-2 (2008),

http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/mandaall.pdf.
246. For instance, many states have laws mandating case plans to both protect
the best interests of a child placed in state custody and to seek return of that child
to the custody of her parent. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4C-55 (1999) (requiring
the state child welfare agency to prepare the case plan in consultation with the
child's parents or legal guardian and, when appropriate, the child). Most States
will not allow parental rights to be terminated unless the State provides clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness and establishes that the termination will
be in the best interests of the child. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS
FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 2

(2007), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/lawspolicies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf.
247. Unless the refusal to provide care is made on some discriminatory basis
identified by existing civil rights laws, providers would be free to engage in
discrimination against purportedly unfit future parents. See ASRM, supra note 4.
248. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 50 (explaining the
requirements of clear and convincing evidence and of consideration of what is in the
best interest of the child in order to terminate parental rights).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 27:311

parenting skills and the threat to a child's interest posed by an
inadequate parent, those determinations must involve some
measure of rigor. The assessments must be individualized-not
based on suppositions or stereotypes-and they must call on the
expertise of a range of professionals, including medical providers
and experts in family or child therapy. 249 If providers want to use
disability as a marker for bad parenting, they should be forced to
supply concrete evidence of an actual assessment of the individual
patient. No such refusals should be allowed to rest on blanket
rejections made without any attempt to ascertain the parenting
skills of the potential patient through interviews with skilled
providers, home studies, or other mechanisms. 250 Such work
would undoubtedly increase the cost of fertility services, 251 but it
would also force healthcare providers to reflect on the seriousness
of their refusals to treat individuals, the consequences of such
refusals for disabled women, and the difficulty of predicting future
conduct.
Fertility providers might also claim a version of a right to
conscientiously object to providing certain types of services to some
clients. There is no doubt that healthcare providers can make
some decisions, even those based solely on conscience, about what
care to provide and to whom. 252 For instance, it would not be
appropriate to force a plastic surgeon to provide unnecessary
plastic surgery to a sixteen-year-old simply because his parents
were willing to pay for it. Many States have determined that
healthcare providers should be exempted from performing
personally objectionable procedures, such as abortion. 25 3 The
same idea applies when discussing fertility care of this nature. As

249. This type of individualized inquiry is precisely what is contemplated by the
ADA. See DOJ, Questions and Answers, supra note 135.
250. These mechanisms are similar to what is already done in the context of
adoption. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, THE ADOPTION HOMESTUDY PROCESS
(2004), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f homstu.cfm (describing the many
elements involved in screening adoptive parents).
251. The cost of a home study can range from $300-$3,000. Id.
252. See Rachel Benson Gold & Adam Sonfield, Refusing to Participatein Health
Care:A Continuing Debate, 3 GU'rMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 8 (2000), available
at http://guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/1/grO3OlO8.pdf (explaining the continued
discussion over mandating contraception coverage).
253. For example:
Forty-five states allow health care providers-whether or not public funds
are involved-to refuse to participate in the delivery of abortion
services.... Moreover, while 39 states protect providers who refuse to
participate in abortion from discrimination, only eight follow the federal
law in also protecting those who do choose to participate.
Id. at 8.
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in the abortion context, these providers do not refuse care because
they perceive a lack of medical necessity in an objectionable
procedure. Instead, the law allows them to turn their backs on
providing a certain type of healthcare because it offends their
dignity, morals, religion, or professional ethics. 254 However, where
a provider's conscience conflicts with a societal and legal edict
against discrimination, it is right for the provider's conscience to
yield. The California Supreme Court has recently found such to be
the case when fertility providers refused to provide services based
on a potential patient's sexual orientation. 255
Despite the
physicians' assertion that they harbored deep personal objections
to helping lesbians become biological parents, the court decided
that discrimination in this context was illegal, as it violated the
state's prohibitions against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.256 Similarly, when a physician's reluctance to help a
disabled woman become pregnant is based on bias, antidiscrimination statutes should provide redress for the person
denied services.
A decision not to provide fertility services because of a
medical risk to the patient or the future child is markedly different
from a decision not to treat based on an evaluation of the future
parenting potential of a candidate.
When there is some
quantifiable risk to a future child, such as transmission of HIV, a
physician might be justified in having concerns about helping a
woman achieve pregnancy. By contrast, where the concern is
essentially about parenting ability, the prohibitions against
discrimination should be available to disabled women, as fertility
specialists do not have the training, skills, or other tools necessary
to fairly assess what is in the best interest of an existing child-let
alone a child who has not yet come into being.257 Fertility clinics
are not child welfare agencies, nor should they be. Physicians

254. See id.
255. Benitez v. North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, 44 Cal. 4th 1145,
1161 (Cal. 2008) (stating that violations of California's prohibition against
discrimination were not protected).
256. See id.
257. According to one scholar:
The best interests standard was developed to afford decisionmakers a tool
with which to make fact-specific inquiries into whether the interest of a
particular child would be served by particular parents. The standard is
thus not particularly well suited to clinical decisionmaking about children
who have yet to be conceived and about whom little is known.
Richard Storrow, The Bioethics of Parenthood:In Pursuit of the Proper Standard
for Gatekeeping in the Clinical Setting, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY (SuPP. 1) S19,

S20 (2005).
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possess tremendous power over women who need reproductive
assistance to conceive a child, but the law should not allow that
power to be limitless. There is little to no legitimacy in predicting
parenting ability based on a person's status as a disabled person.
Denying access to the tools of reproduction premised on nothing
more than knowledge of an individual's disability reinforces the
same stereotypes about disability that the ADA discourages.
E.

The FetalPatient

Even when direct or indirect risks to a future child could be
quantified, there remains the underlying quandary of whether
making a best interests determination about a non-entity is an
appropriate inquiry for a court in any instance. Where the actors
involved in a dispute are all clearly people in the juridical sense,
the question of direct threat can be evaluated with some measure
of legitimacy.258 When, as in the case of individuals seeking
fertility services, the balancing of interests in the direct threat
evaluation involves a person (the fertility patient) and a
nonexistent entity with the potential to become a person, it is wise
to contemplate whether an interest in a hypothetical person can
ever trump the rights of an existing human being. In this case,
the debate is not simply about hypothetical risk; it is also about a
hypothetical person. Debates about abortion, criminalization of
acts that harm a fetus, and control of pregnant women's choices all
raise the question of how to view a fetus for purposes of legal
regulation, but the question at the core of the dilemma raised in
this Article is what is owed in the abstract when no entity259
potential person or otherwise-exists.
Courts and legislative bodies have found multiple occasions
to act on behalf of a fetus. Such actions include prosecutions and
260
successful civil suits against individuals who harm a fetus.
Actions have even been instituted against pregnant women who
258. See DOJ, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual § 111-3.8000 Direct
Threat (1993), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (describing the
analysis of a direct threat to others in the context of the ADA).
259. See, e.g., JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, Is THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON
OF POLICIES ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES (2000) (examining the major areas of law
that could award the fetus the status of personhood).
260. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cochran, 142 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Ky. 2004)
(overruling the "born alive" rule in Kentucky and allowing for criminal convictions
for harm done to a viable fetus); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (allowing a civil suit to proceed against a mother who, during her
pregnancy, took drugs that left her son with brown and discolored teeth); Witner v.
State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997) (upholding the criminal child neglect
conviction of a woman who used cocaine while pregnant).
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have made choices perceived to threaten a fetus. 261 A range of
state laws deals with this issue, with some clearly defining a fetus,
and even an embryo, as a person who is to be accorded all of the
rights owed to all persons. 262 Federal law has also created
criminal sanctions for certain harmful acts committed against a
fetus, including killing or attempting to kill an "unborn child."263
To the extent that a court was comfortable using family law
paradigms to decide issues of discriminatory access to fertility
treatment, it could also be argued that it is not in the best
interests of a child, existing or contemplated, to be raised by a
parent who either has a significant health issue, like HIV, or who
is paralyzed and lacks the physical capacity to provide the daily
care that a child needs.
Faced with the dilemma of evaluating a direct threat to
others, courts may interpret existing law as protecting a fetusthereby making such a direct threat evaluation appropriate, if at
all, when a woman is in fact pregnant. But the most sensible point
at which a fertility provider would choose to discriminate against a
261. See Witner, 492 S.E.2d 777; Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869.
262. The National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) notes that thirty-six
states have fetal homicide laws that qualify a fetus as a person for purposes of
homicide prosecutions. NCSL, FETAL HOMICIDE (2009),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethon.htm ("An in vitro fertilized human
ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is
implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child
in accordance with law.").
263. The operative portion of the law, now codified as Title 18, Section 1841 of
the United States Code, reads as follows:
Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children
(a) (1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of
law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily
injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time
the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section.
(2) (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for
that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under
Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the
unborn child's mother.
(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have
had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or
(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the
unborn child.
(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or
attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall instead of being
punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections
1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing or attempting to
kill a human being.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall
not be imposed for an offense under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004).
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disabled woman would be before she even becomes pregnant. If
the provider's goal is to protect a potential child from perceived
direct or indirect risks, the only logical point at which to do so is
before a pregnancy exists. The provider cannot claim an interest
after the woman is pregnant because he or she could exercise no
control over whether the woman brought that pregnancy to term.
To allow for discrimination due to a direct threat, a court would
have to sanction discrimination based on what is possible, which is
a relatively preposterous basis upon which to litigate (although it,
too, is not without precedent). In the criminal context, courts have
upheld probation conditions ordering individuals not to reproduce,
partly in the interest of protecting future children from a deadbeat
264
dad or abusive parents.
The logical leaps necessary to support this idea are
worrisome. In the context of abortion, it is clear that States have
an interest in pregnancies from their onset. 265 No court, however,
has yet articulated an interest in potential pregnancies that would
allow sanctioning otherwise illegal discriminatory behavior. If a
court protects a physician's interest in acting on behalf of
hypothetical people, just how far might that interest stretch? If
fertility providers serve two patients-the woman seeking
pregnancy and the fetus they both hope to create-on what basis
does the provider claim greater allegiance to one over the other?
Even in the context of an existing pregnancy, courts have been
unwilling to elevate the interests of a fetus above those of the
pregnant woman.266
Here, in contrast to cases involving pregnant women seeking
to avoid forced cesarean sections or blood transfusions, the
potential patient is actually seeking to force a physician to touch
her by providing fertility care, as opposed to asserting her right
not to be touched.267 This is an important distinction, though it is

264. See, e.g., State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the
defendant's right to procreate was not abridged by an order not to procreate after a
conviction for mistreatment of his child); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis.
2001) (upholding a probation condition that a defendant not procreate after his
conviction for failing to pay child support).
265. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming that States have a "legitimate interest" in potential life throughout
pregnancy).
266. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (reversing a trial court order that
allowed for an unconsented cesarean section on a woman dying of cancer).
267. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) (ordering a cesarean section against the wishes of a competent pregnant
woman); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.
1964) (allowing court-ordered blood transfusions for a pregnant Jehovah's Witness).
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not clear that a woman in this position is not as equally entitled to
legal redress as a woman refusing forced treatment. Many
discrimination cases are predicated on forced interactions and
268
intermingling when defendants wished to avoid such contact.
When an employer must hire or retain a disabled employee or a
store must install devices to accommodate the needs of disabled
patrons, the law forces contact that the defendant (here the
employer and store, respectively) sought to avoid. By using the
ADA to force a provider to treat a certain disabled plaintiff, the
law would be forcing an interaction not only to vindicate the rights
of the disabled plaintiff but also, hopefully, to educate the
defendant about the need to provide services based on science
rather than stereotypes.
Conclusion
The goal of this Article is not to claim that fertility providers
should have no ability to determine the scope of their practice by
excluding some individuals from their patient pool. However, both
law and ethics suggest that there are limitations to that power.
Under the ADA, a person who can establish that she meets the
threshold disability criteria of the statute is entitled to an
individualized evaluation of her fitness to participate in fertility
treatment. 269
The crux of this evaluation should be a
determination of whether she is medically fit for the rigors of
treatment and pregnancy and whether her disability is such that
it causes a direct risk to the fetus or others that cannot be
eliminated by readily achievable reasonable accommodations.
When this medical determination finds that a patient's health
status is adequate, the law should be careful about extending the
physician's power so far that the potential parent's disability can
be used to determine that she lacks parenting skills, and thus can
be fairly discriminated against in her quest for procreation.
268. For instance, in employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs may seek to
work for an employer who had fired, refused to hire, or taken some other adverse
employment action against the employee. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion, and allowing
aggrieved plaintiffs to seek remedies including hiring, promotion, and
reinstatement).
269. 28 C.F.R. app. B § 36 (1991) (noting that "[t]he determination that a person
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others may not be based on
generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability" and that
the discrimination must be based on an individual assessment that considers the
particular activity and the actual abilities and disabilities of the individual).
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As the country debates the ethics of fertility treatment and
worries about rogue fertility providers, it is critical to also raise
voices in defense of those who face both natural and socially
constructed barriers to parenting. Women with disabilities have
far too frequently faced discrimination in their quests to become
parents.
As reproductive technology creates expanded
opportunities for these women, it would be a disservice to themand the children who they would raise with love and care-to deny
them the opportunity of biological parenthood routinely given to so
many others.

